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Testing and Tracking in Public Schools
By MICHAEL S. SORGEN*
Sorting Students in School
Racial Isolation in the Classroom
THE United States Supreme Court has made a decisive commitment
to the principle that public education "must be made available to all
on equal terms."1  In its aggressive implementation of that principle,
the Court has nearly completed the task of delineating the vast reme-
dial resources for dismantling the deliberately segregated schools of
the South.2 In recognition of the pervasiveness of school segregation
across the nation, the Court finally agreed to consider in the 1972 term
whether the just as extensively segregated school districts of the North
suffer the original sin of Dixie's formerly de jure systems.3
This daring doctrinal development of racial and educational
equality has been accompanied by extensive thought and analysis by
educators seeking to conform to the Court's dictates while not diminish-
ing the quality of public education. Researchers have diligently ad-
dressed themselves to a number of vital questions, including the ex-
tent of racial segregation in American public schools and its effect upon
* A.B., 1964, Brown University; LL.B., 1967, Harvard University. Member,
California bar; Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). One
question which remains is whether the federal district court has the authority to con-
solidate school districts in a metropolitan area to avoid isolation of minority children
in the inner city schools. See, e.g., Bradley v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 338
F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), order stayed in part, 456 F.2d 6 (4th Cir.), rev'd in part,
462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 2773 (1973).
See also Bradley v. Milliken, 42 U.S.L.W. 2022 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973), which may
raise the same question before the Supreme Court in the current term.
3. Keyes v. School Dist. Number 1, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973). Again, the Court
failed to squarely resolve the issue of de facto segregation, although it did establish
some very important evidentiary presumptions in dealing with segregated schools in
the North. But see id. at 2701 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell).
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equal opportunity and student achievement. Perhaps the most note-
worthy survey of recent times relating to racial disparitites in educa-
tion is Equality of Educational Opportunity, more commonly known
as the Coleman Report.4 By its finding that "characteristics of facilities
and curriculum are much less highly related to achievement than are the
attributes of a child's fellow students in school,"' the report lent sup-
port to the ruling in Brown that segregated facilities are "inherently
unequal" 6 notwithstanding equivalency in tangible resources. The
Coleman Report thus corroborated the philosophical thrust of the
Supreme Court's decision that integration is mandated by the goal
of equality in education.
The research further indicates that the thrust of the Court's ef-
forts may not be in the arena of most crucial impact for the nation's
school children. The public school pupil spends most of his day in a
single classroom. Hence, the racial and social composition of his peer
group within those narrow confines would seem to be a more significant
and direct determinant of the quality of his education than resource
allocation or student assignment in the state or school district.' Some-
what anomalously, then, the Court has devoted its energies to defining
the requirements of equal educational opportunity on the broad scale.
In the classroom context, which forms the heart of the child's educa-
tional experience, the development of a Constitutional mandate is still at
a rudimentary stage.
The Coleman Report itself disclosed that the variations in pupil
achievement were more pronounced among those attending the same
school than were the achievement disparities from one school to an-
other. In fact, the report found that over 70 percent of the variation
in achievement is variation within the same student body.8  Christo-
pher Jencks, in his independent evaluation of the Coleman Report, also
discovered that each school is a microcosm reflecting the disparities of
the larger society. Also according to Jencks, students who perform
best on standardized tests were often enrolled in the same schools as
the students who performed worst; the range of variation within the
typical Northern school was about 90 percent of the range for the ur-
4. The report was named after Dr. James Coleman who was principally re-
sponsible for its design. OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
5. Id. at316.
6. 347 U.S. at 495.
7. See notes 8-10 infra.
8. OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 296 (1966).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
ban North as a whole. The implications are clear. If our objective
is really to equalize educational opportunity, we must focus our ener-
gies on diminishing disparities within the schools rather than between
schools or school districts. As Jencks indicates:
If by some magic we were able to make the mean achieVement of
every Northern urban elementary school the same, we would only
have reduced the variance in test scores by 16-20 percent. If, on
the other hand, we left the disparities between schools untouched
but were somehow able to eliminate all disparities within schools,
we would eliminate 78-84 percent of the variation in sixth grade
competence. 9
The vast disparities of student achievement within the same school
would seem to be conclusive evidence that racial and social composi-
tion of the classroom exerts a stronger influence on student achievement
than the characteristics of fellow students at the school as a whole.
But beyond the elusive goal of equalizing achievement of public school
pupils, a still more compelling reason to focus on the classroom
emerges from the Supreme Court's primary rationale in Brown-the im-
pact of classroom segregation on a child's motivation to learn.1" The
Court emphasized in that landmark decision that minority children were
predestined to more limited educational accomplishments so long as
they felt the stigma and sense of inferiority caused by their segregation
from the educational mainstream.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights asserts that Black
children suffer a greater feeling of inferiority when, though attending
a predominately white school, they "are accorded separate treatment,
with others of their race, in a way which is obvious to them as they trav-
el through the school to their classes."'" Professor Frank Goodman
eloquently describes it:
If separation from faceless white students in other schools and
other neighborhoods on the impersonal ground of residence is
damaging to a Negro child's self-esteem, the daily experience of
being isolated from white students in his own school on the highly
9. C. Jencks, INEQuALirY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFEcr OF FAmLY AND
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 107 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JENCKS]; St. John, Deseg-
regation and Minority Group Performance, 40 Rv. Entuc. RESEARCH 111 (1970).
One comment and analysis of the Coleman Report even concluded that while school
integration does not always improve black student performance, classroom integra-
tion consistently has the beneficial effect of improving black children's test scores.
McPartland, The Relative Influence of School Desegregation and Classroom Desegrega-
tion on Academic Achievement of 9th Grade Negro Students, 25 J. Soc. IssuE, 93, 102
(1969).
10. 2 U.S. CoMM. ON CrvIL RiGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION I TH PUBLIC SCHOOLS
41-42, 86-87 (1967).
11. Id. at 42.
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personal and perjorative ground of ability must be infinitely more
so.1
2
Hence, judicial requirements that schools be integrated without a
similar redistribution of students within each school may be self-defeat-
ing in terms of equalizing educational opportunity.' 3 To involve our-
selves in school district integration or inter district financing while
ignoring the public school child's daily classroom experience is to strain
at a gnat and swallow a camel. It is time for rigorous judicial scrutiny
of "tracking" or homogeneous ability grouping, the most pervasive
cause of racial isolation in our nation's classrooms.
School Classification-The Scholastic Consequences
"Tracking" is the process of identifying and grouping together
school children who appear to have similar learning capacities or learn-
ing accomplishments for the purpose of providing them a differen-
tiated course of instruction.14 This process of classifying and labeling
children is widely practiced in American school systems, although the
term itself is disfavored.' 5 The process includes the euphemistically
termed "special education" where children considered different from
those in the educational mainstream are separated from their peers
and removed to special classrooms or even to different school build-
ings. A child who is deemed of limited learning potential because of
a handicap, abnormality, or special educational problem is thus seg-
regated with other children who share the same disability or distinc-
tiveness, e.g., children who are emotionally or physically handicapped or
mentally retarded. At the other extreme of the special tracking spec-
trum we find children considered mentally gifted and thereby presumed
12. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 430 (1972).
13. Hence, the recognition in the 1969 Civil Rights Act that "'Desegregation'
means the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools without
regard to race, color, religion, or national origin ...... 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b)
(1970) (emphasis added).
14. CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL IMPROVEMENT, UNIV. OF GA., ABILITY GROUP-
ING: STATUS, IMPACT AND ALTERNATIVES (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABILITY GROUP-
ING].
15. Rist, Student Social Class and Teacher Expectations: Tile Sell-Fulfilling
Prophecy in Ghetto Education, 40 HARV. EDUc. REV. 411 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Rist]. See also W. FINDLEY & M. BRYAN, ABILITY GROUPING 1970 (1971). A 1967
survey of the National Education Association found at the elementary school level that
27 percent of school districts grouped all children, 43 percent grouped some and
25 percent reported random grouping. 85 percent of all school districts reported
ability grouping at the secondary level. NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, ABILITY GROUPING RE-
sEARci SUMMARY (1968).
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capable of benefiting from more intensive or more diversified ed-
ucational experience.
Tracking also includes those evaluation and classification deci-
sions which are more central to the general educational process. Stu-
dents are tested and graded, promoted and demoted, and assigned to
classes and teachers according to the school's best estimates of their
academic progress and potential. In secondary school, the entire cur-
riculum is differentiated on the basis of measured academic compe-
tence or ability. Students are counselled to take a program suited to
their "capacities" whether vocational, general, college preparatory or
honors. Such determinations often define not only what the school
will try to teach the child and the character of his classmates, but also
his role and status in life after he has completed his schooling.
This process of sorting and labeling may be required to some ex-
tent by the specialized and differentiated demands of modem society
and economy. From the standpoint of the public schools it might be
urged that such grouping enables the teacher to adapt the pace and
content of instruction to the needs of more students by narrowing the
range of abilities within a particular classroom. Furthermore, by facili-
tating curriculum planning, it should permit the teacher to devote
more individual attention to each student.1" Similarly, the student
arguably benefits by having more realistic criteria against which to
measure his individual progress; he could experience an enhanced
self concept and have improved motivation to learn at his own rate.
17
The salient feature of the grouping system is that to a large extent
it is compulsory. We might ask whether the same purposes might be
served as well by giving every student an equal claim on all public edu-
cational resources. If pupils in elementary schools were assigned to
classes randomly, might teachers then be more apt to respond to chil-
dren's individual needs rather than expecting all of them to learn at the
same rate? If high school students were permitted to design their own
16. M. GOLDBERG, A. PAssow & J. JUSTMAN, THE EFFEcTS OF ABILITY GRoUp-
wNo 150 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GOLDBERG]. A recent survey by the National
Education Association indicates that the majority of teachers prefer to teach classes
grouped by ability. Teacher Opinion Poll: Ability Grouping, 57 TODAY'S EDUC., Feb.
1968, at 53.
17. Goldberg, supra note 15. See also W. BORG, AN EVALUATION OF AmrrY
GROUPING 101-16 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BORG]. The contention that ability
grouping benefits the pupils as well as the teachers would obviate the need to consider
potential conflict between the child's interest and the school's. If in fact ability group-
ing does harm to students placed in lower categories, a more candid review of aca-
demic priorities is warranted.
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curriculum from among the school's diverse offerings, instead of being
segregated into "college preparatory", or "basic" programs, would the
student's own choices of desirable classmates and interesting sub-
ject matter impel many of them to better academic performance? Given
the diversity of aspiration and interest, such a reform might not make
students appreciably more equal after they finish school, but surely a
volitional system would be more in accord with our egalitarian ideals.
Even proponents of ability grouping must concede that our knowl-
edge of the diverse needs of children is remarkably primitive. i8 School
classifications are too often based upon academic skills alone, and
even such decisions are highly inaccurate when grouping is done across
the subjects of the school curriculum. Groups homogeneous in one
field will prove heterogeneous in others. 9 Moreover, given the num-
ber and variety of differentiating characteristics among children, and the
inability of public schools to devise programs adequately tailored to in-
dividual needs, the result is a gross simplification of the differences.
Of necessity, then, the schools make crude and incorrect classification
stereotypes.
Perhaps because of the rudimentary nature of criteria and tech-
niques with which to make these classification decisions, educational
research indicates that homogeneous grouping has little effect on pu-
pil achievement for those in accelerated groups and has often tragic
consequences for children relegated to the lower ability strata."
In fact, the manner in which the same school treats different
children may be a more significant determinant of pupil performance
than the initial criteria for the classification decision.2 There is, for
example, substantial support in educational literature for the hypoth-
esis that low expectancy by the child's classroom teacher diminishes
the motivation of children in low ability tracks. The child who re-
ceives signals that he is regarded as a school "failure" and who thereby
18. See, e.g., PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN THE EDUCATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CHIL-
DREN (R. Jones ed. 1971); L. DEXTER, THE TYRANNY OF SCHOOLING: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE PROBLEM OF STUPIDITY (1964).
19. ABILITY GROUPING, supra note 13.
20. Id. at 3; BORG, supra note 17, at 102-06 (ability grouping may have motivated
bright pupils more fully to realize their potential, but it seemed to have little effect on
the slow or average pupils); GOLDBERG, supra note 16, at 12. See also NAT'L EDUC.
AsS'N, ABILITY GROUPING RESEARCH SUMMARY 44 (1968).
21. See, e.g., R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM
(1968); ELASHOFF & SNow, PYGMALION RECONSIDERED (1971); Rist, supra note 15;
Rosenthal & Jacobson, Teacher Expectation for the Disadvantaged, 28 SCIENTIFIC AM.,
April 1968, at 19-23.
1134 [Vol. 24
feels ignored, responds by provoking the teacher and refusing to do as-
signments. As a result, he fails to develop the social skills which might
bring a more positive response.2 Proponents of ability grouping ar-
gue that such placement might heighten the self-esteem of students as-
signed to lower tracks by relieving them from competition, with vastly
superior students. The research, though far from conclusive, sug-
gests the contrary.23  As Judge Skelly Wright noted in Hobson v. Han-
sen:
The real tragedy of misjudgments about the disadvantaged stu-
dent's abilities is . . . the likelihood that the student will act out
the judgment and conform to it by achieving only at the expected
level. Indeed, it may be even worse than that, for there is strong
'evidence that performance in fact declines. . . . And while the
tragedy of misjudgments can occur even under the best of cir-
cumstances, there is reason to believe that the track system com-
pounds the risk.2-
Based on the hopeless conclusion that "these kids are dumb" and can-
not be properly educated, the children are surrendered to a barren, iso-
lated and unstimulating environment which virtually assures that the
initial prognosis will prove true. Homogeneous ability grouping as
now practiced in many American schools reflects in a sense the belief
of teachers and school administrators that children experiencing learn-
ing difficulties will never catch up. Accordingly, these school per-
sonnel are unlikely to create or develop programs tailored to the needs
of individual children.
Educational innovators are now beginning to recognize that a
monolithic achievement standard is inadequate for children who des-
perately need school experience to meet them at their present level.
The question should not be whether a child is above or below "nor-
mal" achievement in reading, but rather whether he is meeting his own
individual learning capability.25  Instead of concentrating the de-
feated and stigmatized children in a lower track almost impossible to
control, let alone to teach or to inspire, more flexible and diversified
techniques must be tried. Interage grouping, where older children who
22. C. JENCKS, THBE COLEMAN REPORT AND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM (1970);
Comer, The Circle Game in Tracking, 12 INEQUALITY IN EDUc. 25 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Comer].
23. BORG, supra note 17, at 300-02.
24. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 491-92 (D.D.C. 1967), a 'd sub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Larry P. v. Riles,
343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F.
Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S.
1013 (1972).
25. Comer, supra note 22, at 25-26.
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are themselves academic failures are paid to tutor younger children with
learning difficulties, is "making a comeback from the days of the one
room schoolhouse."26  This kind of stratified heterogeneous grouping
has been of value to both groups of children in a Baltimore experi-
ment.2 7  Another rediscovered approach is that of individualized pro-
grammed instruction where children with a wide range of abilities learn
the same basic skills at different rates within the same classroom by use
of prescribed sequential experiences.28  In still another attempt to mod-
ify current classification practices, schools have utilized teams of teach-
ers with different responsibilities, under the leadership of coordinat-
ing teachers.2 9 All of these experiments involve subtler distinctions
among patterns of cognitive development and a great deal more flex-
ibility than current programs which group only students of similar abil-
ity.30 The innovations are based on the premise that children, what-
ever their background or apparent intelligence, can find stimulation
by experiencing success rather than meeting the dead end of determi-
native competition. These experiments at least attempt to recognize
in educational terms the infinite permutations of classroom achieve-
ment.
Perhaps even more important, these programs are often of lim-
ited duration because they reject the assumption that learning capacity
is immutable." They thus stand in stark contrast to the rigid, inflexi-
ble and more typical tracking system described by Judge Wright in Hob-
son, whereby track assignments made early in elementary school were
essentially permanent for about 90 percent of the students,32 and the
vast majority of those did not take courses outside of their own curric-
ulum.3 3  Students assigned to the basic track essentially were rele-
gated permanently to an education more stifling, less stimulating and
in most respects inferior to that offered other students.
3 4
26. Id. at 23.
27. ABILITY GROUPING, supra note 14. (highlights conclusions and recommenda-
tions).
28. Comer, supra note 22, at 23.
29. ABILITY GROUPING, supra note 14.
30. Hall, On the Road to Educational Failure: A Lawyer's Guide to Tracking, in
INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION (1970); Lesser & Stodelsky, Learning Patterns Among the
Disadvantaged, 34 HARV. EDUc. REV. 546 (1967); Findley, How Ability Grouping
Fails, in INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION, No. 14, 38-40 (1973).
31. See C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1970).
32. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 461-63 (D.D.C. 1967).
33. Id. at 464-68.
34 Id. at 513-14. The significance of the statistical showing of no mobility
within classifications is uncertain, however. It may indicate the accuracy of actual
assessment and assignment. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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To the extent that there is a relationship between education and
social mobility, an inflexible tracking system which ratifies social class
stereotypes is basically undemocratic. It is certainly a departure from
the American public school ideal promoted by educational reformers
in the last century, whereby the school would serve as an object lesson
in equality and brotherhood by drawing students from every social,
economic and cultural background into the close association of the class-
room.35 As Judge Wright expressed it:
Even in concept the track system is undemocratic and discrimina-
tory. Its creator admits it is designed to prepare some children
for white-collar, and other children for blue-collar jobs. Consider-
ing the tests used to determine which children should receive the
blue-collar special, and which the white, the danger of children com-
pleting their education wearing the wrong collar is far too great
for this democracy to tolerate. 36
The Role of Law
Whether democratic or not in its result, academic ability is a rele-
vant, even fundamental, criterion in virtually every educational sys-
tem. Moreover, for better or for worse, there are academic differences
between students. It is often not irrational for school officials to take
such differences into account, for example, by instituting compen-
satory programs for students who are not performing up to their scho-
lastic potential. Even if it could be shown, however, that homoge-
neous grouping is not conducive to academic excellence, or that
adapting a child's educational experience only to his present level of
proficiency stifles his educational growth, an unwise policy is not nec-
essarily an illegal one.
The law intrudes with trepidation into an area such as grouping
or grading which lies at the heart of a schoolman's special claim to
competence. When a student is discharged from a high school3 or
35. H. MANN, THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL; THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 8,
32-33 (1957).
36. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 513 (D.D.C. 1967). Judge Wright's
conclusion is supported by considerable research indicating that tracking effectively
separates students along socio-economic and racial lines. ABILITY GROUPING, supra note
15, at n.56; SExTON, EDUCATION AND INCOME: INEQUALITIES OF OPPORTUNITY IN
OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1961); 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CvIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 165 (1967).
37. E.g., Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburn, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913)
(dismissal of high school student for academic insufficiency). Cf. Isquith v. Levitt,
285 App. Div. 833, 137 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1955) (discretion regarding registration for
grammar school); Sycamore v. Wickham, 80 Ohio 133, 88 N.E. 412 (1909) (pro-
motion to seventh grade).
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university, 8 not as discipline for misconduct but because of demon-
strated inability to do the required work, courts are likely to defer to
the educators. Similarly, no judge is about to force the University of
California to open its doors to all persons who have obtained a high
school diploma, or no diploma at all, on a first-come-first-served basis.
Standards for educational advancement are essential to every institu-
tion and school officials are uniquely well-equipped to evaluate those
standards. 39  In the absence of bad faith, arbitrariness or capricious-
ness, courts will not intervene. 4°  As the Court stated in Connelly v.
University of Vermont:
The effect of these decisions is to give the school authorities abso-
lute discretion in determining whether a student has been delin-
quent in his studies, and to place the burden on the student of
showing that his dismissal was motivated by arbitrariness capri-
ciousness or bad faith. The reason for the rule is that in matters
of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely qualified by
training and experience to judge of the qualifications of a stu-
dent, and efficiency of instruction depends in no small degree
upon the school faculty's freedom from interference from other
noneducational tribunals. It is only when the school authorities
abuse this discretion that a court may interfere with their deci-
sion to dismiss a student.41
Although the courts have sometimes reviewed school classifica-
tion decisions to determine whether a student was treated arbitrarily
under the school's operative standards, 42 there is no case in which dem-
onstrated academic ability has been held constitutionally invalid as a
criterion for educational selection. The uniform treatment required
by the equal protection clause does not prohibit the state or its schools
from distinguishing among its citizens.43 As the Supreme Court noted
in Carrington v. Rash, "[Miere classification . . . does not of it-
38. E.g., Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965) (dis-
missal of medical student for scholastic deficiency); Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150
F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) (refusal to renew scholarship or permit registration of
graduate student); Eddie v. Columbia Univ., 8 Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1951)
(rejection of doctoral dissertation).
39. See, e.g., Brown v. Educational Testing Serv., Civil No. C-71-2029 (N.D. Cal.,
Feb. 1, 1972) (student denied admission to university on basis of test score not
deprived of any constitutional right).
40. See Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968); Lai v. Board
of Trustees, 330 F. Supp. 904, 906 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
41. Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156, 160 (D. Vt. 1965).
42. E.g., Petit v. Board of Educ., 184 F. Supp. 453 (D. Md. 1960); Jones v.
School Bd., 179 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Va. 1959), af 'd, 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960);
Ackermen v. Rubin, 35 Misc. 2d 707, 231 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1962).
43. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 239 (D. Minn. 1970).
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self deprive a group of equal protection. 44
Indeed, numerous cases have recognized the propriety of educa-
tional classifications based solely on academic competence. 45 As the
Court declared in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Educa-
tion: "[]t goes without saying that there is no constitutional prohi-
bition against an assignment of individual students to particular
schools on the basis of intelligence, achievement or other aptitudes upon
a uniformly administered program. .... -4" Thus the Court in Miller
v. School District No. 2, permitted the school district to separate
students according to slow or accelerated sections and to center its
vocational curriculum at one school for financial or pragmatic rea-
sons.
Even in Hobson v. Hansen, the most far-reaching judicial foray into
school classification, Judge Wright meticulously pointed out that ability
grouping could be reasonably related to the purposes of public educa-
tion, and that the mere fact of differential treatment would not neces-
sarily offend.4 8 It is clear that courts, properly recognizing their lack of
competence in matters of education, have been reluctant to challenge
scholastic classifications or make judicial determinations of educa-
tional needs. It is only where courts have been able to determine that
some educational need exists, and that school authorites are provid-
ing no education, that a needs-satisfaction approach has led to judi-
cial action.49 Otherwise, the classifications are viewed as essentially
scholastic decisions, better left to the academicians.
A judicial role has been traditionally found, however, where
school practices have resulted in racial disparities or racial separation.
Failure to defer to school authorities in such cases can be explained by
two factors. First, Brown v. Board of Education"0 left undeniably
clear its premise that racial separation is morally and philosophically
unacceptable and inherently unequal. Largely because of the forma-
44. 380 U.S. 89, 92 (1965). See also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,
484 (1968).
45. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 230 F. Supp. 74, 75 (N.D.
Fla. 1964); Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957); Pittman v. Board of
Educ., 56 Misc. 2d 51, 287 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1967).
46. 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964).
47. 256 F. Supp. 370 (D.S.C. 1966). See also Goss v. Board of Educ., 305
F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1962); Board of Educ. v. Clendenning, 431 P.2d 382 (Okla. 1964).
48. 269 F. Supp. at 511-12.
49. E.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tive role of education, the courts have consistently required racial
mixture in the schools so as to lay the foundation of a society in which
races are not separated, alienated and hostile. Secondly, the willing-
ness of courts to intervene where racial separation occurs can be ex-
plained by the implicit recognition that educational separation usually
means inferior education for minorities and that the courts are often
the only effective vehicle for their right to equality. 1 When those
few are a "politically voiceless minority" who have no avenue of re-
dress outside the courts, greater scrutiny must be applied to their dis-
parate treatment. And when their interest is the vitally important one
of education, perhaps the most important means available for them to
alter their separate status, the courts must not tolerate differential treat-
ment without a substantial justification. Otherwise, state action, ad-
versely affecting the quality of education for only that small group
might well escape the political repercussions attendant upon decisions
diminishing educational quality for all.
When there is a nexus between school classifications and racial
or social class characteristics, the courts have been willing to intrude
upon the schoolmaster's domain. When lower income and minority
group children are isolated in the lower tracks, these classification
decisions might be seen to deny equal protection of the laws to a cer-
tain class of individuals. If teachers, unaccustomed to dealing with
newly integrated classes, utilize special education programs to rid
themselves of "problem children",52 that classification scheme perpet-
uates unlawful school segregation. Similarly, where designation of a
formerly all black school as vocational and a formerly all white school
as college preparatory resulted in continued segregation, the system
was deemed unlawful.
5 3
In other instances where a showing of systematic racial differen-
tiation has been shown, courts have reviewed the standards or criteria
used in assigning students to particular schools or classes.5 4  In school
51. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). But see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 397 (1970).
52. See, e.g., Moscowitz, Problem Children in San Francisco Schools, San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Feb. 23, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
53. Banks v. Claiborne Parish School Bd., 425 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1963) (cannot use personality
interview as a basis for transfer with regard to race); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d
494 (4th Cir. 1963) (cannot use different transfer rules for Negroes and whites); Dil-
lard v. School Bd., 308 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962) (cannot place Negro pupils on the
basis of academic tests not used for whites); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d
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districts which had previously operated segregated and inferior ele-
mentary schools, courts rejected efforts to employ ability grouping or
achievement tests as the basis for assignment or transfer of pupils.55
Such assignments were at best in conflict with the requirement to inte-
grate, at worst a deliberate subterfuge to perpetuate the dual system.
The rationale for such a ruling was typically articulated by the dis-
trict court in Moses v. Washington Parish School Board: The objective
fairness of assignment of students on the basis of performance disap-
pears when "black students who until recently were educated in ad-
mittedly inferior schools are now competing with white students edu-
cated in superior schools for positions." 56
Where classification schemes create disparities of educational op-
portunity along racial lines, the equal protection clause is the tradi-
tional tool for scrutinizing the schools' sorting process. Yet, there is
scant legal precedent beyond the regional borders of the South for re-
viewing school classification practices which create racial imbalances
in the classroom. Since Hobson, California has become the principal
battleground over educational testing, purported academic competence
and educational placement. Pending litigation in the federal courts of
that state provide a laboratory for the analysis of some quite difficult
questions in this still uncharted area of the law. What kind of showing
should be required to constitute a prima facie case of denial of equal
educational opportunity? How much of an injurious effect must the
complainants demonstrate and how is this effect to be measured? To
what extent can we borrow a workable analytical framework from cases
involving de facto segregation, employment discrimination or jury se-
lection, and adapt it to school classification practices in northern and
urban schools? How relevant is the motivation of school officials
and how valid are their justifications for various grouping pro-
grams? Finally, perhaps the most difficult question is what effect would
various available remedies have on the quality of life in our public
schools?
156 (5th Cir. 1957) (standards required to guide school board on desegregation
transfers).
55. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Sunflower County School Dist., 430 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Tunica County School Dist., 421 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.), vacated in part on other
grounds, 396 U.S. 226, 996, rev'd in part on other grounds, 396 U.S. 290, 1053 (1970);
Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962). See Green, Separate and Unequal
Again, in INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION, No. 14, 14-16 (1973) (suggesting that ability
grouping is used deliberately to perpetuate segregation).
56. 330 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (E.D. La. 1971).
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The Case Against Tracking
Disproportionate Impact
Systematic academic differentiation of students in our public
schools invariably leads to segregated classes, whether it takes the form
of special education or ability grouping.17  Though there is little dis-
pute about the fact of racial separation, the causes are more uncertain,
and therefore so are the legal consequences. Whether because of as-
piration and interest, different home environment and cultural orien-
tation, or distinctions made by the schools through the criteria and
processes of pupil assignment, substantial racial and ethnic isolation in
public school classrooms results from school classifications. Obvi-
ously, the underlying reason for the situation will be largely determina-
tive of the school district's legal responsibility for it.
5
8
California is a good laboratory, both because of the range and
diversity of special education and other tracking programs and be-
cause of the pendency of litigation contesting the present racial distri-
bution in such programs. Absent a convincing explanation in terms
of cultural or racial differences, we would normally expect that actute
learning disabilities, exceptional academic talent or other inherent dif-
ferentiations would be randomly spread throughout the population,
irrespective of racial, ethnic or socio-economic background. For ex-
ample, it would seem surprising if the percentage of children with phys-
ical impediments (i.e. blind, deaf and dumb or perceptually handi-
capped) would be greater for any segment of the school population.
The number of minority children with physical handicaps group
should approximate the proportion of that group to the total school pop-
ulation. The same would seem to apply to emotional or psychological
disturbance or to severe retardation. The conditions are fairly easily
diagnosed, and we know of no racial or genetic characteristics which
would account for a significant statistical difference from one group to
the other.
Our initial suspicions are corroborated by the following chart at
least in regard to Trainable Mentally Retarded, Educationally Handi-
capped and Physically Handicapped.
57. JENCKS, supra note 9.
58. In Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 519-20 (C.D.
Cal. 1970) the court voided racially discriminatory teaching which was attributed to
a number of factors, including: (1) culturally discriminatory tests, (2) assumptions
by counsellors and teachers that black children will achieve poorly, and (3) deference
to parental requests which favors the more assertive parents of white middle-class
children.
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Title Chart: Classifications in California Schools59
Spanish Other
Surname White Negro Oriental
Mentally Pupils 3,168 80,322 2,277 4,769
Gifted Percent 3.5 88.3 2.5 5.2
Educable Pupils 11,476 20,424 12,400 325
Mentally Percent 25.4 45.2 27.5 .7
Retarded
Trainable Pupils 2,011 6,966 1,373 191
Mentally Percent 18.9 65.4 12.9 1.8
Retarded
Educationally Pupils 2,532 20,092 2,065 126
Handicapped Percent 10.1 80.2 8.2 .5
Physically Pupils 3,410 9,167 1,963 279
Handicapped Percent 22.7 61.0 13.1 1.9
Ungraded Pupils 296 647 118 3
Continuation Percent 27.5 60.0 10.9 .3
TOTALS Pupils 712,475 3,294,401 416,801 99,388




Mentally Pupils 56 408 91,000
Gifted Percent .1 .4
Educable Pupils 243 279 45,147
Mentally Percent .5 .6
Retarded
Trainable Pupils 35 80 10,656
Mentally Percent .3 .7
Retarded
Educationally Pupils 140 106 25,061
Handicapped Percent .6 .4
Physically Pupils 38 167 15,024
Handicapped Percent .3 1.0
Ungraded Pupils 4 10 1,078
Continuation Percent .4 .9
TOTALS Pupils 17,393 37,668 4,578,126
School Percent .4 .8
Population
However, in two categories of special education, both of which rely
heavily on intelligence tests for selection,"° there is a substantial dis-
59. BUREAU OF INTERGROUP RELTIONS, CArnFOqR~A DEP'T OF EDtUC., RACIAL
AND ETHmc SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as RACIAL AND ETHNIC SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS].
60. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902 (West 1969) specifies a number of factors which
must be fully explored before a child may be placed in an EMR class, but the IQ test
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porportion in the representation of minority groups. Not surprisingly,
these programs for Mentally Gifted Minors and for Educable Mentally
Retarded (marginally retarded), often considered the opposite ends
of a tracking spectrum, are the subject of much legal ferment and liti-
gation.
One pending case dealing with the classification of Spanish speak-
ing children is Diana v. State Board of Education,6 where the nine
plaintiffs and four other children constituted the entire class for the
educable mentally retarded (EMR) in the Soledad Elementary School
District. Twelve of the thirteen were Mexican-American. Of the ap-
proximately 45,000 children in EMR classes in the State of California
during the 1966-67 school year, 26 percent were of Spanish surname,
while students of this ethnic and cultural background comprised only 16
percent of the state's total public school population.6 2  One year and
four months after the parties had stipulated to new procedures (in-
cluding translation of tests into the child's primary language) for the
evaluation and placement of Spanish surname children in classes for
the retarded, statewide statistics indicated only a slight diminution
of the racial disproportion.63
The complainants' uncontroverted statistics, adopted by the
is the crucial criterion. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.07 (West 1969) requires that an
individual test be administered as a prerequisite to placement in a class for the re-
tarded. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.085 (West 1969) stipulates a child may be con-
sidered retarded only if other information "substantiates" the test score. See Larry P.
v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
61. No. C-70-37 RFP, Stipulation and Order filed Feb. 5, 1970. See also
Guadalupe v. Tempe Elementary School District, Civ. No. 435 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24,
1972) for a similar stipulated order.
62. RACIAL AND ETHNIC SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 59,
at table 1. These statistics were uncontested during the litigation.
63. The percentage of Spanish surname children in California public schools on
April 30, 1971, was 15.6, whereas their representation in educable mentally retarded
classes (EMR) remained at 25.4 percent. RACIAL AND ETHNIC SURVEY OF CALIFOR-
NIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 59, at table 1. Hence, after extensive review of
statistics from the State Department of Education and lengthy negotiations among the
parties, a second stipulated settlement was signed and made the order of the court in
Diana on June 18, 1973. This order, which supersedes the court's prior order of
February, 1970, provides a detailed five-year program for alleviating the wrongful
placement of Chicano children of normal intellectual ability into classes for the
retarded. The consent order recognizes that although many school districts have
eliminated the overrepresentation of Chicanos in such classes, a significant variance
still exists in some 235 districts out of the 1130 districts in the State. The order
then details an affirmative action plan to eliminate the disparity and further remedial
action, including the possible cut-off of state funds from those districts which continue
to discriminate. Contempt proceedings to enforce that order are presently pending
before the district court.
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Court in another challenge to the EMR program, Larry P. v. Riles,"4
indicate an even larger statewide disparity for black children. Although
representing only 9.1 percent of the public school population, blacks
comprise 27.6 percent of California's classes for the educable re-
tarded. a5
A similar showing was made for the San Francisco Unified School
District in which the plaintiffs were registered. While only 28.1 percent
of students in the San Francisco District were black, more than 60 per-
cent in classes for the educable retarded were black children. The dis-
parity was even greater in the elementary schools where almost 70
percent of EMR children were black, more than twice the proportion
of Blacks in the district population.66 If one looks at the Mentally
Gifted Minor program (MGM) where tests of intelligence or scholas-
tic aptitude are also the major determinant of selection,617 one again
finds racial disporportion; minority groups are characteristically un-
der represented in the MGM program designed to ensure a more stim-
ulating, intensive educational experience to its participants. The Oak-
land Unified School District, for example, which has 60.5 percent black
children, 8.5 percent Spanish surname and 24.1 percent "Other white",
has a gifted program which is 71 percent white, whereas blacks comprise
64. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (order granting motion for preliminary
injunction).
65. RACIAL AND ETHNIC SuRvEY OF CALFoNrA PuBLIC ScHooLs, supra note 59,
at table 1.
66. Affidavit of Neal Snyder (Exhibit "C" to Complaint) (Based upon SAx
FRANcisco UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST., RACIAL ESTMATES OF PuPrLs ATTENDING SAN
FRANcIsco PUBLIC ScHooLs AND SUMMARY OF ACTIVE ENROLLMENT IN SPECIAL ED-
UCATIONAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1970)).
67. In general, a child is placed in the MGM program if he/she either demon-
strates or is believed to possess such intellectual capacity as to place him/her within
the top 2 percent of all students in his grade throughout the state. CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 6421(a) (West 1969). IQ tests are exclusively the criteria for children in grades
K-6 and are supplemented with achievement scores for grades 7-12. CAL. ADM. CODE
tit. 5, § 3821(a), (b). Up to 5 percent of the total number of children placed in the
program need not achieve the requisite 132 on IQ tests if selected by teachers and
school administrators as "exceptional." CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 5 § 3821(c). Another
exception permits up to 2 percent of "culturally disadvantaged" (i.e. prevented from
fully developing intellectual and creative ability because of language, cultural, economic
or environmental handicap) children in the district to be placed in MGM classes with-
out the administration of an IQ test, but the method of funding by the State Depart-
ment of Education encourages reliance on the tests. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 5, § 3822.
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6426 (West 1969). Since a district is reimbursed only
for testing children who are successfully identified as "mentally gifted" by scoring
well on the tests, there is a disincentive to screen children whose talent is not made ob-
vious by their performance on standardized tests.
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only 15 percent and Spanish surname only 3 percent.6 8  In San Fran-
cisco, where special efforts to recruit minority children into the gifted
program have met with some success, the disparity is much less. Blacks
comprise 32.3 percent of the total school district and just 19 percent
of the gifted classes; Spanish surname children, who constitute 14 per-
cent of the district, are just under 7 percent of those in the gifted
classes, and Caucasians as well as Orientals are represented in greater
proportion than in the district as a whole.69 Although reflecting a con-
siderable disparity, these figures put San Francisco barely within the State
Guidelines which permit a 15 percent discrepancy."
A related and not atypical situation involving an elitist high school
in San Francisco recently became the subject of litigation." 1 The chal-
lenge was to the allegedly discriminatory assignment of students
to Lowell High School, which is designated and maintained as an ex-
clusively "academic" or "college preparatory" public school. The ba-
sis for admission is not standardized tests, but primarily school grades
received in the low semester of the ninth grade in junior high school.7"
68. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST., APPLICATION FOR PRIOR APPROVAL OF PRO-
GRAM FOR MENTALLY GIFTED MINORS, Aug. 1, 1972 (Report required by CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 6423, 6426 (West Supp. 1972).
69. See Memorandum of William B. Cummings, Supervisor of Programs to Gifted,
to Associate Superintendent, San Francisco Unified School Dist., Sept. 14, 1971 (re-
garding steps to recruit minority students). Statistics are taken from SAN FRANCISCO
UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST., MGM RACIAL COUNT, ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS (1970).
70. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.095 (West Supp. 1972) requires each school district
to submit an explanation if the proportion of minority children varies more than 15
percent from their representation in the district as a whole. A motion for supplemen-
tal relief in conjunction with the San Francisco elementary school integration suit was
denied in the summer of 1972. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., Civil
No. 70-1331 (N.D. Cal., filed July 24, 1972). The motion attacking racial segrega-
tion in the gifted program was largely based on the court's language in its previous de-
segregation orders. In the preliminary order of April 28, 1971, the parties were ad-
monished to prepare plans for the "[alvoidance of use of tracking systems or other ed-
ucational techniques or innovations without provision for safeguards against racial seg-
regation as a consequence." The final judgment provided in pertinent part: 'The Judg-
ment and Decree does not require gifted children to be held back. They may be given
special preferences or attention or handling in any manner which does not involve or
promote racial segregation." Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F.
Supp. 1315, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The District was further enjoined from
"[aluthorizing, permitting or using tracking systems or other educational techniques
or innovations without effective provisions to avoid segregation." Id. at 1322.
71. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., Memorandum Opinion and
Order of Summary Judgment, Dec. 19, 1972, appeal docketed, Civil No. 73-1686 (9th
Cir., filed April 11, 1973).
72. Grades are not the entire criteria for admission, however. Certain courses
which must be taken by Lowell applicants during the ninth grade are restricted to
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No doubt, Lowell students are furnished "special' educational resources
and opportunities. The legal questions raised by this case are similar
to those we must consider in evaluating the legality of a separate
"college" curriculum at any comprehensive high school, since the only
difference is that the Lowell students are physically isolated in a sepa-
rate school.
73
The San Francisco District operates the normal type of compre-
hensive high school to which students are customarily assigned on the
basis of residence within the geographical area served by the school.74
In addition, there are a number of special schools. Opportunity High
is a small experimental program designed for students who are not suc-
ceeding in the conventional senior high school setting but who are po-
tentially able to succeed. Students interested in attaining a vocational
skill as well as a high school diploma attend John O'Connell Voca-
tional High School. Admission to either Opportunity or O'Connell is
largely a matter of choice.75  Samuel Gompers is a nonaccredited high
school, serving working students who wish to attend school part-time
and foreign born students who do not communicate well enough in En-
glish to learn effectively in a comprehensive high school. As some-
what of a "dumping ground" for disciplinary problems and oth-
ers who are difficult to educate (mostly for language difficulties),
Gompers inevitably contains a large proportion of nonwhites.
Finally there is Lowell, a nondistricted academic high school
which draws from the entire city rather than from specific districts, as
is the case with comprehensive schools.70 Lowell is open to the 15
percent of the city's total high school population with the best academic
credentials. Analysis of the racial composition of the entering class at
Lowell for the 1971-72 school year indicates that blacks comprise 7.5
percent and Spanish 5.2 percent of the Lowell student body as contrasted
with 25.5 percent and 13 percent respectively on a district wide
basis. A review of the schools which Lowell students previously at-
tended demonstrates a direct relation between previous enrollment at a
segregated school and inability to gain admittance to Lowell. Four
predominantely white junior high schools accounted for well over half
students who have passed prerequisite examinations in the eighth grade. Id., affidavit
of Ruth McClane.
73. All numberical data is derived from SAN FRANcIsco UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST.,
RACIAL ESTIMATES OF PuPiLs ATTENDING SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1971).
74. Berkelmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., Memorandum Opinion and
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of all students admitted to Lowell.17  Moreover, the twenty-seven
schools designated by the court in Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
School District7 8 as segregated black schools send a total of ninety-eight
students to Lowell in the last entering class, as compared with the
twenty-seven segregated white schools which sent more than three
times as many.
7 9
Despite the absence of school district data on the economic status
of its students, the plaintiffs in Berkelman did a study based upon dis-
tribution of federal money under Title I, the Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act, since the funds are designated for educational
services for children from low income families. The figures showed
that the elementary schools with the greatest concentration of pupils
from poor families (as indicated by receipt of Title I funds) accounted
for the smallest proportion of admissions to Lowell in 1971-72. The
finding of economic discrimination was further corroborated by Lowell
students' minimal participation in the Federal School Lunch Program,
another reliable index of poverty.8"
Lowell is a public school, but not in the sense that it is open to any
student who wants to attend. As in the MGM program, access to
privileged schoolmates and stimulating learning is limited to those
who meet the competitive criteria for selection. In both cases, we find
an elitist academic program primarily populated by children of the
dominant culture, a bastion of educational privileges from which mi-
nority children and those from the lowest socioeconomic groups are
systematically excluded. Similarly separated on the opposite shore of the
educational mainstream are special classes for the educable retarded
and lower levels of the general tracking spectrum, where minority
children are grossly overrepresented.
If tracking is seen as a reflection of the mutations of scholastic
merit found in every academic system, then it superficially appears to
coincide with basic premise of competitive democracy-every school
child should have an equal opportunity to become unequal. But when
the tracking system maintains the racially disproportionate distribu-
tion of social benefits in our society, then it is indistinguishable in le-
gal terms from any other form of school segregation or racial discrim-
ination.
77. Id.
78. 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (the elementary school desegregation case
in the same district).
79. Id. Exhibit 3 to complaint (uncontroverted).




In explicit cases of school segregation, there is a presumption that
irreparable harm exists regardless of the comparative evidence of test
results, teacher salaries, student-teacher ratios, class size or dollar ex-
penditures. Following the mandate of Brown, we assume that placing
inner-city children from low socioeconomic strata and/or minority
ethnic backgrounds together in class with other children similarly con-
vinced of their academic inferiority will not enhance their educa-
tional advancement. As the court noted in Jackson v. Pasadena City
School District:
The separation of children from others of similar age and quali-
fications solely because of race may produce a feeling of inferiority
which can never be removed and which has a tendency to retard
their motivation to learn and mental development. [citing Brown]. 8 '
The deleterious effect of racial isolation within the same school is
still more severe than that of between school segregation.A12 Hence,
the rationale of a per se rule that segregation is "inherently un-
equal '8 3 should apply with still greater force. In the classroom, as in
the school district, the mere showing of statistical imbalance should
suffice to prove an inherent denial of equal educational opportunity.
Even absent a traditional case of classroom segregation, the courts have
appropriately begun to recognize that homogeneous ability grouping
is educationally detrimental to students regularly relegated to the
lower tracks.8 4
The most obvious injury is probably to minority children dispro-
portionately assigned to classes for the educable retarded.85  Given the
limited design of such programs to make the children "economically
useful and socially adjusted"' 88 and the minimal curriculum, placement
in such a class can be seen as a lifetime sentence to illiteracy and pub-
liec dependency. Minimal mobility of minority children from such
classes normally assures that classification as "retarded" will endure
81. 59 Cal. 2d 879, 883, 382 P.2d 878, 881, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 609 (1963).
82. 2 U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
1-4 (1967).
83. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 383, 395 (1954).
84. See, e.g., Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D.
La. 1971); Spangler v. Pasadena Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Hob-
son v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
85. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See
also J. Mercer, The Use and Misuse of Labeling Human Beings: The Ethnics of Testing,
Tracking and Filing, Oct. 16, 1971, paper presented at Kennedy Symposium on Human
Rights, Retardation and Research.
86. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 6902 (West 1969).
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throughout a child's educational career.8 7  Moreover, the irrep-
arable damage is manifested in stigmatizing notations on a pupil's
permanent school record, the low level of teacher expectation and of
pupil self-esteem, and the humiliation and sense of inferiority. 8
The Coleman Report conclusions regarding the relationship be-
tween classroom peer group and pupil performance make it doubtful
that a marginally retarded child would benefit as much from place-
ment in an EMR class as from remaining in a regular class. Further-
more, if the added financial and educational resources now devoted
to EMR were redistributed to normal classrooms, the improvement in
overall education might more than compensate for the additional dif-
ficulty of dealing with the EMR children in regular classrooms.8 9 The
school district argument that to place a retarded child in a regular
class would subject him to humiliation and failure is the same argument
used by southern school districts in resisting desegregation; it gains no
persuasiveness in regard to tracking. Even the contention advanced
by school authorities that the pace, curriculum and small class size in
EMR programs are beneficial to retarded children does not controvert
the assertion that the minority student who is mislabeled and inappro-
priately placed in such a class is harmed thereby. 90
Undeniably, the deprivation and stigma are less direct and less
evident for the minority child denied access to the elite special program
at the highest strata of the track system. At least the minority child,
though systematically excluded from these special programs, is receiving
the kind of public education intended for most of the district's pupils.
He is not labeled "special" in a manner which connotes abnormality or
limited educability. He is not burdened by the demoralizing recognition
that he cannot advance beyond an educationally hopeless status quo.
But if the child's educational development is frozen in the immutable
87. The basic track was found to be a rather permanent one in Hobson v. Han-
sen and the evidence indicated a similar pattern in Larry P. for EMR placements. The
relative lack of mobility of minority students placed in classes for the retarded was
indicated in J. CHENAULT, MENTAL RETARDATION AS A FUNCTION OF RACE, SEX AND
SociO-EcONOMIC STATUS (1970).
88. Bettelheim, Segregation: New Style 66 THE SCHOOL REV. 251, 265 (1958)
describes the overwhelming isolation of children labeled retarded and how they inevi-
tably "succumb to hopelessness." The difficulty of a retarded person maintaining his
self-esteem in light of the "shattering stigma [which] dominates every feature of his
life" is discussed in R. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE; STIGMA IN THE
LIvES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 204-08 (1971).
89. Affidavit of Edward M. Opten, filed Feb. 22, 1972, Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F.
Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
90. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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glacier of academic strata, "ice is also great and will suffice" 91 to stifle
his creative growth. The average student at the typical comprehensive
high school is hardly free to select among the vast array of courses of in-
struction or to utilize the superior library resources and other facilities
at Lowell. 92  The child in a regular classroom does not derive any
advantage from the smaller class size, greater individualized instruc-
tion, lesser time spent on distractive discipline, or special intensive
study opportunities offered in the district's program for the mentally
gifted.93 It makes no difference which group is isolated from the edu-
cational center when the less favored group, the victim of academic
abnegation, remains the same.
Once again we hear the often repeated arguments of southern
anti-integrationists transposed to a new context: it would do a minority
child more harm to thrust him into a more accelerated and more
competitive educational milieu. If he were unable to handle the work,
he could be afflicted with emotional problems, exacerbated in the
case of minority children because of less support at home or different
peer group interests. Once again, this argument must be rejected.
First, the underlying premise of this contention is that quality education
is futile for children who, to that point, have been prevented from
fully developing their intellectual and creative ability because of some
cultural, economic or environmental handicap. It might be assumed
equally well that such children may be expected in time and with ap-
propriate curricular modifications to perform at a level equivalent to
the most gifted children of the dominant culture. Furthermore, the
child unprepared to compete with higher levels of the meritocracy
in school will likewise lack the credentials for economic success or
for improvement of his social status when he emerges from the public
school. To postpone the potential expansion of a child's creative ca-
pacity until after school is to cancel it. The result is to perpetuate the
class and caste stereotype which characterize children when they first
enter the schoolhouse gate. In short, it is to deny equal educational
opportunity.
Fear of the remedial ramifications may also make us more insen-
sitive and more unsympathetic to the plight of pupils denied access to
91. Robert Frost argues in Fire and Ice that both will suffice for destruction of
one's world.
92. For instance, the plaintiffs in Berkelmen showed that Lowell offered a choice
of nine foreign languages, whereas Woodrow Wilson High School offered only two.
93. See SAN FnRcIsco UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST., PROGRAMS FOR THE GInnD,
STATUS REPORT, (1972); OAKLAND UNIFD SCHOOL DIsT., APPLICATION FOR PRIOR
APPROVAL OF PROGRAM FOR MENTALLY GIFTED MINORS (1972).
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elite academic offerings. Whereas the child harmed by an inappropri-
ate confinement in a class for the retarded or in a low track can
simply be removed from that class, the remedy is not so simple for the
child previously excluded from an accelerated program. Community
opposition would undoubtedly be intense if a court ordered minority
and low income children admitted in greater numbers into classes for
creative and intellectually superior school children, especially if it means
displacing children already there. Even without such displacement
there might be a harmful impact on children in the fast track who, seeing
themselves as an academic elite, perform accordingly. When more
students are assigned to the special program, the distinction diminishes
and the reward loses its meaning. The student can no longer feel he is
getting ahead because no longer are his classmates so visibly left be-
hind. White parents who view their own children as academically ad-
vanced will fight to retain the superior status and learning opportuni-
ties. Their latent opposition to integration may well crystalize when
they are deprived of separate segregated corners in the newly integrated
schools. Similarly, teachers who find more satisfaction working
with highly motivated children in stimulating classes will also feel
threatened by the addition of children from a different culture.
It may even result that black and other minority children will not
succeed in the fast tracks from which they were previously excluded,
and that the racial disparity in pupil achievement will be only slightly
reduced if at all. Nonetheless, any system of rewards and punishments
based on racial differences should be disassembled, regardless of its ed-
ucational impact. The most important effect of classroom desegre-
gation may well be its long range conduciveness to racial harmony
in the society at large, its ability to make diverse racial and cultural
groups rethink their relationships to each other. If these groups
emerge from newly integrated schools as alien to one another as be-
fore, the struggle which commenced with Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion will have been in vain. Judicial resolution of tracking dispari-
ties must be based not on speculation as to the academic impact but
upon "burden of proof ... and straightforward moral and con-
stitutional arithmetic.
''9 4
Shifting the Burden of Proof
Once a substantial racial and economic imbalance in the class-
rooms is shown, school district officials ought to be required to rebut
94. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971).
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the inference that racial factors caused the disparity95 and to demon-
strate that significant educational benefits far outweigh the resulting
racial isolation. 96  If they fail to do either, and if it cannot be shown
that the tracking system accomplishes what it purports to do, then
there is neither pedagogical nor legal justification for the special class
treatment. Those children unjustifiably confined in special classes or
lower tracks should then be reassigned to regular classes and provided
special assistance to facilitate their reintegration.
In racial discrimination cases, "statistics often tell much, and
courts listen. 9 7  Classifications based upon race have long been
viewed with the greatest suspicion.98 Classifiers who select race as
their criterion are faced with the heaviest justification burden.99 In le-
95. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971) es-
tablished the presumption in schools that are substantially disproportionate in racial
composition. The presumption in Swann relates to the propriety of remedy and not to
the finding of initial constitutional violation. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Cases-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697,
701 (1971); But the Supreme Court has now made it quite clear that a similar pre-
sumption arises in determining the legal responsibility of northern school districts.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973) the Court asserted that once
a prima facie case of segregation is made, "it is both fair and reasonable to require
that the school authorities bear the burden of showing that their actions ...were
not motivated by segregative intent." Id. at 2695. Cf. Copeland v. School Bd., 464
F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1972).
96. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) es-
tablished a similar burden on school officials to show "material and substantial dis-
ruption" before limiting the rights of students to free expression. The Supreme Court
in Keyes refused to decide whether the "significant benefits" inherent in a "neighborhood
school policy" would of themselves justify racial or ethnic concentrations. 93 S. Ct.
at 2699. However, there is persuasive language in the concurring opinions of Mr.
Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Powell that even important educational reasons cannot
diminish the initial constitutional responsibility to bring about integrated schools.
Such factors, if indeed they can be shown by school districts, would more appropriately
be considered in framing a remedy. Id. at 2700-11.
97. Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276
(5th Cir. 1972); accord, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Board of Educ., 396
F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1968); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.),
aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962). But cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972) where plaintiffs made a statistical showing that the percentage of Negroes and
Mexican Americans was greater in AFDC than in other welfare categorical programs
and that the State had allocated funds to the other programs which more ade-
quately met the recipients' financial needs. The Court characterized this as a "naked
statistical argument" where there were rational bases for the discrepancy and no infer-
ence of racial motivation.
98. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
99. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 n. 17 (1970).
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gal terms, we say that a prima facie case has been established when a
clear cut segregative impact is shown.'0 0 The result is a reversal
of the traditional equal protection test in which the plaintiffs must prove
the irrationality of a challenged classification. Instead, the burden
shifts to the defendants to justify the apparently discriminatory result.
This conceptual approach finds support in cases involving public
housing, employment discrimination and jury selection, as well as school
desegregation. For example, if a greatly disproportionate number of
blacks fail a job qualification test, then the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to explain how the test is valid as a criterion for employment.'
Similarly, where administration of an ostensibly neutral testing device
results in large scale exclusion of blacks and low income people from
jury lists, the burden shifts to the state to justify the selection cri-
teria.' 2 Finally, when a school district's methods of delineating
school boundaries result in student bodies that are substantially seg-
regated, the school district must demonstrate the educational relevancy
and validity of its methods.'
0 3
Still unresolved, however, is the quantum of evidence sufficient
to shift the burden. In the jury selection cases where the standard is
"substantial racial proportion"'0 4 and infinitesimal mathematical prob-
ability that a discrepancy could occur without discrimination was held
to establish a prima facie case.'0 5 In the analogous area of reappor-
tionment for legislative districts, the standard is one person, one vote
"as nearly as is practicable."'1 6  The Court recently allowed as much
as 16 percent deviation between districts which was "unavoidable de-
spite a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality."'0 7  The dissent
would have allowed this variation only on a showing that more precise
100. See cases cited note 97 supra.
101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
102. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967); Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971).
103. See, e.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966);
United States v. School Dist., 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125
(7th Cir. 1968).
104. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970). In Turner, the county popula-
tion was 60 percent black while only 37 percent of those selected for grand or petit
juries were black.
105. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967).
106. Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
107. Mahan v. Howell, 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973).
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equality could not be achieved without jeopardizing some critical gov-
ernmental interest.'
08
Applying an equally nebulous standard in the school context, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,09
asserted that a "gross discrepancy" from HEW guidelines in a particular
school created an inference of deliberate discrimination. , The recent
desegregation case of Wright v. Council of Emporia"° offers some
guidance, because the Supreme Court refused to permit the establishment
of a separate school district even though the augmentation in segregative
effect was only minimal. However, this case might be seen as merely
an implementation of the duty to desegregate effectively, in that any
regressive effect might have been disapproved.
In Larry P v. Wilson Riles, Judge Peckham articulated a primary
reason for shifting the burden of proof in a school classification case as
the presumptive invalidity of racial classification. Classifications based
on race "must be scrutinized with particular care since they are con-
trary to our traditions and hence are constitutionally suspect."': A
concomitant cause for special concern when state action disadvantages
"politically defenseless minorities" is that for these groups "the judi-
cial branch of government is often the only hope for redress of their
legitimate grievances.""'
The court in Larry P then gives as a second reason for shifting
the burden of proof the positive duty of the school district to avoid
racial imabalance. 31 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed-
ucation might well have been cited as authority for this proposition,
since it accords extensive discretion to the district courts to fashion a
decree enabling school districts to achieve "the greatest possible de-
gree of actual desegregation.""'  Imposition of an affirmative duty to
desegregate prompted the Supreme Court in Swann to presume an
impermissible cause from the mere existence of racial imbalance and
to resolve all uncertainties against the school board:
Where the school authority's proposed plan for conversion from a
108. Id. at 992.
109. 373 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
110. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
111. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
112. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 513 (D.D.C. 1967).
113. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
114. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 697, 701-02 (1971).
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dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of
some schools that are all or predominately of one race, they have the
burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely
nondiscriminatory. The court should scrutinize such schools, and
the burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the
court that their racial composition is not the result of present or
past discriminatory action on their part." 5
Judge Peckham embraces a third rationale for requiring defend-
ants to justify their classification: statistical imbalance normally would
not occur in the absence of racial discrimination. Analogizing from
the employment discrimination cases, the court said:
[T]hat for most unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, an ample pool
of qualified or potentially qualified workers of both races exists;
and if racial imbalance in the workforce nevertheless occurs, it is
likely to be the consequence of racial discrimination. The anal-
ogous assumption in the instant case would be that there exists a
random distribution among all races of the qualifications necessary
to participate in regular as opposed to EMR classes. Since it
does not seem to be disputed that the qualification for placement
in regular classes is the innate ability to learn at the pace at which
those classes proceed . . .such a random distribution can be ex-
pected if there is in turn a random distribution of these learning
abilities among members of all races. 16
Still another reason which might support shifting the burden,
but which was not discussed by the court, is the traditional
doctrine "that where facts pleaded by one party lie peculiarly in the
knowledge of the adversary, the latter has the burden of proving it.
'"" 7
Once the statistical imbalance in the classroom composition is dem-
onstrated, the information necessary to account for the racial discrep-
ancy is almost exclusively within the defendant school district's of-
fice files. Hence, the party with the power to produce the fact should
be called upon to respond with an explanation of the perceived dif-
ference.
Equal Education and the Schoolman's Burden-the Legal Vocabulary
For at least the last two decades, a dual standard of equal protec-
tion review has existed." 8 It is said that when a suspect classification
is created," 9 or when a fundamental interest is infringed,1 20 then the
115. 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
116. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
117. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE fl 318 (1954).
118. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1076
(1969).
119. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964).
120. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).
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state must come forward to show that its action is required by a com-
pelling state interest. Otherwise, the state need only advance a ra-
tional justification. 12 1  It has become increasingly clear that "suspect
classification" and "fundamental interest" are words of art, more not-
able for the judicial reactions they cause than for their descriptive
value.' 22  There can be no doubt that education is fundamental. It
is the central feature in the formative process of growing up; it is pre-
requisite to vocational, professional, and social achievement; it pro-
vides the primary workshop selected to fulfill this country's moral and
philosophical commitment to racial equality. Yet only a short while
after the California Supreme Court determined that education was a
fundamental interest, 23 with quotation marks about the phrase and le-
gal consequences attendant upon the conclusion, the United States Su-
preme Court determined that it was not.124 Despite its conclusion, the
Court went to great pains to reiterate the great importance of educa-
tion in this society. 12 5 Thus, education remains unchallenged as a
fundamental interest in all but the most artful sense, and the following
statement from Brown loses none of its validity:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our rec-
ognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.
It is required in the performance of our most basic public respon-
sibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foun-
dation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for la-
ter professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education.
126
It cannot be seriously argued that education is only an ameliora-
tive enterprise voluntarily undertaken by government where to insist on
rigid parity of treatment "savors of the discredited notion that the state
may not reform a particular evil without attacking all others of the
same genus.' 27  Education is not only "a right which must be made
121. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
122. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
123. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
604 (1971).
124. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
125. Id. at 29-30; but see id. at 35-37 for the implication that perhaps education
still is a fundamental interest.
126. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
127. Goodman, DeFacto Segregation.: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis,
60 CALE'. L. REV. 275, 357 (1972).
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available to all on equal terms" 2 8 but one which cannot be denied to all
on equal terms. Though a municipality may close its swimming
pools to avoid racial mixing, 2 9 it cannot close its public schools to
avoid integration,"10 because public education is too important an en-
terprise of state and local government.
The universality of compulsory school attendance laws is not
only a recognition by the states of the importance of education but a
differentiation from other services which may or may not be provided.
The required nature of school attendance assures its recipients a sus-
tained and intensive contact with schooling during a major portion of
their lives. Thus, aside from the relevancy of education to the attain-
ment of other rights and privileges, it might well be seen as an end in it-
self. Education is asserted to have a significant role in shaping the
emotional and psychological components of personality and as a ma-
jor determinant of economic success. Despite the Supreme Court's re-
cent retreat from simplistic categorization of schooling as a fundamen-
tal interest, we need not hesitate in asserting that it is "the sina qua
non of useful existence.'
31
What also remains, without reservation, is the fact that classifica-
tion by race is a suspect classification. The determination of the
United States Supreme Court that education is not a "fundamental in-
terest" is bound up in a judicial trend, at least at the top, away from
the expanding role of the so-called New Equal Protection, with its
dual standard of review. It is unlikely that we may see interests or
classifications adjudged fundamental or suspect if they have not already
been so declared. Yet it is altogether unlikely that any retreat will be
made from the judiciary's total hostility to racial classifications.
3 2
Justice Harlan, long an opponent of the New Equal Protection, was
consistent in his belief that, while the strict scrutiny compelling justi-
fication standard should be avoided in the interest of judicial re-
straint, 133 that standard should be applied to classifications based upon
race."3 In Dandridge v. Williams,1"' the Court refused to find welfare
128. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
129. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
130. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
131. Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 375, 411 P.2d 901, 908, 49 Cal. Rptr.
805, 812 (1966).
132. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
133. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618. 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969).
135. 397 U.S. 471 (1969).
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subsistance payments to constitute a fundamental interest, and there-
fore refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review. The
Court went out of its way, however, to state that no allegation was made
that the state plan was "racially discriminatory [in] purpose or ef-
fect."'18 6 Had it been so, the standard of review would have differed.
The legal conclusion can be drawn with certainty about racial
isolation in the public schools: educational facilities segregated by race
are inherently unequal and are therefore unacceptable. School of-
ficials might claim, for example, that it is educationally justifiable to
assign black students to the same classes in order to avoid interracial
strife, or to assign black teachers to teach black students on the ground
that a better response might be achieved. While these reasons might
appear "rational", they cannot suffice to justify segregation in the pub-
lic schools so long as other alternatives are available to preserve
racial peace or to promote the instructional function. Separation of
racial or ethnic groups in our public schools cannot be tolerated un-
less there is both a compelling state interest and a convincing neces-
sity to rely on the classification in order to effectuate that interest. 
37
Furthermore, where that racial separation results from purport-
edly neutral scholastic criteria, Brown and analogous race discrimina-
tion cases suggest that a court demand a similar justification. The
school authorities must be able to show that use of their testing and
tracking procedures are necessary to advance a compelling educational
need, and that no less segregative alternatives exist which could meet
that need.
Racially Neutral Criteria and Segregative Intent
Despite the inflexible certainty of considering the fundamentality of
interests and the suspect nature of classifications in other instances of
discrimination, the courts have struggled to define the nature of the
school district's burden where the classification is not explicitly based on
race. In Larry P. v. Riles' 38 the district would "have a near impos-
sible burden to sustain" if the classification were explicitly racial, 39
but characterizing the imbalance resulting from IQ tests as de facto
136. Id. at 485 n. 17 (emphasis added).
137. Brown v. Board of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).
138. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
139. Id. at 1309.
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segregative, the court required the defendants only to come forward
with a "rational" justification.1 0 The court in Chance v. Board of
Examiners... found that examinations for supervisory positions in the
school district had a prima facie discriminatory impact, but rejected the
argument that the district's conduct should be treated as intentionally
discriminatory. 4 ' Both courts, while ostensibly demanding a rational
nexus between the examinations and what they purported to test,
found in favor of the minority plaintiffs despite the school district's ar-
guments that no better means of selection were available. Both ap-
plied a more exacting standard than normally associated with the
rational justification test.
14 2A
The reasoning of these cases rests on the premise that school au-
thorities have a lesser constitutional responsibility when classroom im-
balance results from the use of ostensibly neutral criteria rather thau
from an explicitly discriminatory policy. The conceptual approach is
not only without precedent but is directly contrary to numerous Su-
preme Court cases in which the compelling interest standard was




In other areas of racial discrimination the application of seemingly
neutral standards which result in the exclusion of particular racial
groups has repeatedly been declared unconstitutional regardless of the
superficial neutrality of such requirements. Thus, in Labat v. Ben-
nett, ' the exclusion of daily wage earners from juries-resulting in
the elimination of black citizens-was held violative of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Fifth Circuit
aptly noted, "a benign and theoretically neutral principle loss its aura
of sanctity when it fails to function neutrally."' 45  Similarly, in Greg-
140. Id. at 1311.
141. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
142. See also Armstead v. Starkville School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (1972).
142a. As one commentator would describe it, the courts "found bite in the equal
protection clause after voicing the traditionally toothless minimum scrutiny standard."
Gunther, A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972).
143. E.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (imprisonment for failure to pay a
fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax). As well, the California Supreme Court in
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), struck down
a school financial scheme which operated as an invidious discrimination against the
poor by making the quality of education a function of wealth. The discrimination did
not appear on the face of the statute.
144. 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967).
145. Id. at 724. See also Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
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ory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,14 6 the district court found that an appar-
ently neutral employment policy of refusing to hire applicants with
certain arrest records failed to function neutrally and was
unlawful because it has the foreseeable effect of denying black
applicants an equal opportunity for employment. . . . even
if it appears, on its face, to be racially neutral, and its implemen-
tation has not been applied discriminatorily or unfairly as between
applicants of different races.147
In cases particularly pertinent to the problem here, where the dis-
criminatory impact results from a seemingly neutral test or other measure
of competence-whether to perform adequately on a job'48 or to in-
telligently participate on a jury- - -49 the lack of specific intent to dis-
criminate cannot offset the grossly discriminatory results of the criteria
or standard. As the Court stated in Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority: 5
It is not enough that the factors producing the classification and
the consequent inequality are themselves objectively neutral
and without a background of even latent discriminatory purpose:
when the effect is to deprive some citizens of rights that should be
equally available to all, then there must be a compelling justifi-
cation.151
If these decisions are logically applied to the public schools, the
intentional use of a criterion for pupil selection and placement which
is relevant'52 but which in fact produces a discriminatory impact,
should suffice to require school authorities to step forward and present
a compelling justification for the evaluatory device which they have
chosen.
Nonetheless, some lower courts still consider whether the discrim-
ination was intentional, although the question of intent is normally
146. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
147. Id. at 403 (citations omitted).
148. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Chance v. Board of Ex-
aminers, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
149. See Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971).
150. 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
151. Id. at 1358, accord, Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir.
1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393
U.S. 801 (1969).
152. The court in Carmical noted decisions such as Carter v. Jury Commission,
396 U.S. 320 (1970), and Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), in which the Su-
preme Court approved the use of intelligence or education as legitimate criteria for
jury service. But the state could not rely on screening devices, once a discriminatory
effect was shown, unless they in fact measured what they purported to measure and
unless no less discriminatory alternative was available.
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irrelevant once a prima facie case is shown. Perhaps this is a form
of recognition that testing and scholastic evaluation are central to
the academic function, and perhaps it is done out of deference to
the schoolman's special competence in the making of educational policy.
Yet this approach evokes the fading jurisprudential philosophy with
regard to de jure segregation; intentional acts are viewed as a prerequi-
site to the assignment of responsibility for the existence of racially dis-
proportionate impact. The view is typically articulated in Jones v.
School Board,153 where the mere existence of racial imbalance was
simply irrelevant when it resulted from the "fair application" of fac-
tors such as intelligence or scholastic attainment.
What is decided is that the establishment of a school on non-ra-
cially motivated standards is not unconstitutional because it for-
tuitously results in all-Negro or all-white enrollment. The need
for education under reasonble conditions supersedes the need for
absolute integrated education under unreasonable conditions.154
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held in Keyes v. School District No.
1' that racially imbalanced schools do not offend so long as the school
district is not motivated by a purposeful desire to perpetuate and main-
tain racial segregation.' 56 Courts taking this approach' in effect grant
a presumption of administrative regularity to the school district, and re-
quire the plaintiffs to show intent. The appellate court asserted in Keyes:
153. 278 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1960); cf. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 244 F.
Supp. 353, 365 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 230 F.
Supp. 74, 76 (N.D. Fla. 1964).
154. Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163, 169 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
155. 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973).
156. The result in Keyes is somewhat anomalous because the court found part of
the school district segregated by intent, but the core city area racial isolation was de-
termined to result from neighborhood patterns. Other cases have usually dealt with a
school district as a unit and imposed a duty to desegregate the entire district on the ba-
sis of finding de jure segregation in some of the local schools. E.g., Kelly v. Guinn, 456
F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. School Dist. No. 151, 404 F.2d 1125
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971). Indeed, this was the primary basis
upon which the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Keyes. Mr.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, emphasized that racially inspired school board
actions normally have an impact beyond the particular schools which are subjects of
those actions. Thus, the Court concluded that, unless the geographical structure of
natural boundaries had the effect of dividing the district into separate, identifiable and
unrelated units, proof of segregation in a substantial portion of the district suffices to
support a finding of the existence of a dual system. 93 S. Ct. at 2695, 2697 (1973).
157. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d
261 (1st Cir. 1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. de-
nied, 377 U.S. 929 (1964). But cf. United States v. School District No. 151, 404
F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 990 (1961).
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With the knowledge that we have said that rfeighborhood
schools may be tolerated under the Constitution, it would be incon-
gruous to require the Denver School Board to prove the non-exist-
ence of a secret, illicit, segregatory intent.
158
This analysis may be superficially appealing because of the diffi-
culty ostensibly imposed upon the school board to prove the nonexist-
ence of unlawful intent. In light of school administrators' lack of di-
rect responsibility for residential and demographic patterns, what more
could be demonstrated of their good will? But consider the insur-
mountable evidentiary task if the plaintiffs were obliged to convince a
court of the subjective ill will of governmental officials. Only school
authorities who make the selection of school boundaries or of classi-
ficatory criteria and standards are in a position to demonstrate the
legitimacy of their motives. In addition, given the evident difficulty
of judicial exploration into the subjective domain of state officials,
the Supreme Court, at least in cases of previously dual school systems,
has preferred to avoid speculation into motive or purpose and to rest
constitutional precepts on empirical analysis of the objective and
tangible results.1 9 The Court reaffirmed in Alexander v. Louisiana6 .
its long standing position that "affirmations of good faith in making in-
dividual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of sys-
tematic exclusion."''
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court regarding require-
ments of school desegregation, Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporia,162 the majority opinion emplicitly disapproved the dominant
purpose test. Citing Brown and discussing other school desegregation
cases, the Court concluded: "[A]n inquiry into the 'dominant' moti-
vation of school authorities is as irrelevant as it is fruitless ....
Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose or motivation
-of a school board's action . . . . The existence of a permissible
purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."'
3
158. 445 F.2d at 1005; accord, Gomperts v. Chase, 329 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal.
1971).
159. "LT]he purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect
S.. abridged constitutional rights." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385
(1968). Accord, Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
160. 405 U.S. 631 (1972).
161. Id. at 632.
162. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
163. Id. at 451. This language is a bit difficult to reconcile with the majority
opinion in Keyes which established a series of evidentiary presumptions in ascertaining
segregatory intent. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Keyes, accusing
the Court of establishing a sectional double standard and asserting that the issue had
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This approach is imperative in regard to testing and tracking be-
cause school classification decisions are rarely racially motivated. They
are purportedly prompted by estimates of student ability or educational
requirements, yet they consistently have significant and harmful conse-
quences for the minority children who are isolated on the lower levels
of the school spectrum. Moreover, the difference between deliberate
discrimination and discrimination where racial motivation may be lack-
ing seems insignificant when compared to the impact upon the chil-
dren, who under either program suffer the same racial segregation in
the classroom. The harmful effects of racial isolation are too similar
in the north and south to support a different constitutional treatment.
As Judge Wright said in Hobson v. Hansen: "[Tihe arbitrary quality
of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair . as the perversity
of a willful scheme.'
'1 64
It would be naive to ignore the omnipresent hostility of white ma-
jorities throughout this country to association with blacks-in schools,
in classrooms or in residential neighborhoods. A separate rule for
north and south is not only completely illogical, but there are strong
moral imperatives for a nationally uniform constitutional considera-
tion of school desegregation issues. 1 5 Continued application of a dou-
ble standard would constitute an invidious sectional discrimination,
rightfully and bitterly resented by a large segment of the southern com-
munity.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,'66 the
Supreme Court did not reach the question "whether . . . school segre-
gation [as] a consequence of other types of state action, without any
discriminatory action by the school authorities, is a constitutional
violation . . . 117 But the implications for the north were clearly out-
lined because the seemingly innocent criteria held inadequate in this
de jure system was the one most common in the north-assignment of
students to schools on the basis of geographic proximity. The Court
held that affirmative steps must be taken to assure that student bodies
are no longer racially identifiable, and then clearly indicated that the
burden was not discharged by a mere showing that school segregation
already been resolved in Wright that intent is "irrelevant." See also Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275
(1972), for a discussion of the "thorny questions" which arise in proving racial moti-
vation at trial.
164. 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967).
165. See Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There is But One Constitution,
7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1972).
166. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
167. Id. at 23.
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resulted from segregated residential patterns. It was quite simply as-
sumed that the undisputed existence of past discrimination partially
caused the present segregated patterns. 168
Just as the Courts have examined areas of school officials' discre-
tion in assignment of pupils and teachers, 169 constructing and locating
schools and attendance boundaries, 170 or enforcing transfer and zoning
policies171 to find de jure acts of discrimination in the north, so
must they find in regard to tracking and classification practices. 17  If
the objective fairness of assigning students on the basis of test scores
or academic performance disappears for competing black students who
previously attended inferior segregated schools in the South, 7 3 the same
conclusion must be drawn with equal force in a northern urban dis-
trict where in fact the schools and classrooms have been substantially
segregated.'
74
Despite the widespread use of testing and tracking in American
schools, there is very little consensus about its impact on the quality of
education. The only certainty is that it produces racial segregation, yet
its use continues. With full knowledge of the segregative consequences
of the procedures, school authorities continue to categorize and separate.
To perform an act with known consequences is to intend the conse-
quences; this concept runs through the law. In the context of testing
and tracking, then, the supposed dichotomy between de facto and de jure
segregation is simply not important. Where school officials have for
some time employed academic standards or testing devices in the classi-
168. See generally Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for
Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 697 (1971).
169. See, e.g, Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd,
433 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. School
Dist. No. 151, 301 F. Supp. 2d 201 (N.D. Ill. 1969), modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971).
170. See, e.g., Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315
(N.D. Cal. 1971); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
171. Id.
172. Cf. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Spengler v. Pasa-
dena Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967).
173. See Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La.
1971), affd, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972).
174. Plaintiffs made this argument in Berkelmen v. San Francisco Unified School
District, where in the earlier desegregation case of Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
School District, the court had specifically found lower salary level reflecting lower
level of teacher experience and larger class size in predominantly black schools. 339
F. Supp. at 1332-36. Furthermore, the most segregated black schools in Johnson ob-
tained the lowest proportionate representation in the student body at the academically
superior high school challenged in Berkelmen.
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fication and assignment of pupils, and when the result has been a
continuing and consistently disproportionate impact upon minority
groups, discriminatory intent can be inferred from the natural, probable
and foreseeable effect of perpetuating racially identifiable class-
rooms. 1 75  It is the school authorites who are imposing a segregated ed-
ucational structure, and it is they who are mandated to change. As
one commentator put it: "In every case of racially imbalanced schools
sufficient responsibility can be ascribed to government to satisfy the
requirement that stems from the equal protection clause's proscription
of unequal treatment by government."' 76 Indeed, unless we are to read
Swann one way for previously de jure systems in the south and another
for the equally segregated schools in the north, we are obliged to find
that racial imbalance is itself a denial of equal protection.' 7  Given
the affirmative duty imposed in Swann, any school board which does
not take all feasible steps to alleviate or eliminate classroom imbalance
can be held responsible for its continuation.'
78
How Neutral Are the Tests?
To the extent school administrators employ devices which pur-
port to test innate ability or scholastic aptitude, they will have a dif-
ficult time justifying a discriminatory result. To diagnose differences
in intellectual endowment on the basis of performance on IQ tests
is to assume that cultural differences and numerous other variables
175. See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971): "[Plroof
that a pattern of racially segregated schools has existed for a considerable period of time
amounts to a . . . racial classification by the state and its agencies, which must be
justified by clear and convincing evidence." Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734
(E.D. Mich. 1970); cf. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
See also Keyes v. School District No. 1, 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2700 (1973) (Mr. Justice
Douglas, concurring).
176. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concept,
78 HAmv. L. REv. 564, 584 (1965) (footnote omitted).
177. This theory is apparently the basis of a number of decisions attacking ra-
cially discriminatory school programs. See, e.g., Taylor v. Board of Educ., 249 F.2d
36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 328 F.
Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Spengler v. Pasadena School Bd., 311 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.
Cal. 1970); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967); Blocker v. Board of
Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
178. This reading of Swann was used to attribute responsibility to the Las Vegas
School District despite some genuine attempts to integrate in Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d
100 (9th Cir. 1972). However, in Copeland v. School Board of Portsmouth, 464 F.2d
932 (4th Cir. 1972), racially disproportionate impact did not suffice to require dis-
continuance of special programs. Rather than to require an "inflexible [rule of] racial
balance" the court remanded for consideration of the reliability and relevance of the
criteria used. Id. at 934.
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have been effectively isolated. According to Dr. Jane Mercer, per-
formance on the IQ tests might indicate greater mental capacity
[ilf two persons have had an equal opportunity to learn certain
types of cognitive, linguistic, and mathematical skills and to ac-
quire certain types of information; if they are equally motivated
to learn these skills and to acquire this information; if they were
equally motivated to exert themselves in a test situation and equally
familiar with the demands of the test situation; [and] if they
Were equally free of emotional. . . and biological. . . difficulties
which might interfere with their performance .... 179
Unfortunately, however, all these other factors are never equal, and
probably cannot be made equal in a test situation. Beyond simple
reflex acts and basic organic processes, few human attributes or be-
haviors are culture free. Among the many cultural differences which
favor persons from the dominant culture in which the tests were devel-
oped are intrinsic interest in the test content, rapport with the examiner,
drive to excel on the tests and past habits of solving problems indi-
vidually or cooperatively.1 80  The use of instruments like the WISC or
Stanford-Binet in school classification decisions is especially invalid for
minority children who rarely have the same opportunities to acquire
the skills and attitudes required for successful performance.18'
If our intent is to discover how much an examinee has learned
in a particular area, such as a course in school, we select items which
probe for the distinctive learning the school intended to impart.
Normally, we label this an achievement test. If we wish to predict a
child's success in school, we seek specific evidence of knowledge which
bodes favorably for future academic performance. We call the test an
aptitude or ability test, but we are still measuring only what was
previously learned. It is the relevance of the learning we select for our
investigation which determines who will succeed on the test. Hence,
179. Mercer, Institutionalized Anglocentrism Labeling Mental Retardates in the
Public School, in 5 RAcE, CHANGE AND URAN SocMTY 311, 322 (P. Orleans & W. Ellis
eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Mercer].
180. A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 251 (3d ed. 1968). This is not to sug-
gest that only cultural factors influence success on intelligence tests. A child may be
tired, hungry or under emotional stress ona particular day and have trouble concen-
trating. He may have undetected problems in vision, hearing or other handicaps which
interfere with his performance.
181. In psychological terms the test is not "objective" because it fails to isolate ex-
traneous factors such as race or culture. See, e.g., R. HURLEY, PovERTY AND MENTAL
RETAlDATioN: A CASUAL RELATIONSHIP (1969); R. MASLAND, S. SmusON & T. GLAD-
wIN, MENTAL SuDNonMALrry (1958); Neff, Socio-economic Status and Intelligence:
A Critical Survey, 35 PSYCHOLOMCAL BULL. 727 (1938); Kagan, The IQ Puzzle: What
Are We Measuring?, INEQuALrrY IN EDUCATiON, No. 14, 5-13 (1973).
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whatever the label of the testing instrument, we cannot speak of innate
ability unless we eliminate cultural variables in the previous learning
experience.
Content is inevitably culturally oriented. For example one stand-
ardized test asks the child what he would do if he were sent to buy a
loaf of bread and the grocer said he did not have any more. The only an-
swer for which maximum credit is given is "I would go to another
store." This response assumes a middle class urban or suburban en-
vironment with more than one grocery. A recent examination of a
set of protocols on poor black children from a large city found that many
answered "go home," which is a perfectly intelligent answer for which
they were given no credit."8 2 Similarly one of the plaintiffs in Larry P.
received no credit for a picture arrangement until retested by a
black psychologist who elicited an explanation perfectly logical according
to the child's experience and environment.18
An even more obvious problem is the use of language which can
seriously effect the extremely sensitive relationship of testor, testee
and testing instruments. The "retarded" plaintiffs in Diana were sub-
jected to perhaps the grossest kind of linguistic prejudice. Unfamil-
iar with any language other than Spanish, their mental capacity was
evaluated on the basis of a test in English. One might argue that the
school administrators whose judgment is so poor that they would rely on
test results despite the insurmountable barrier to children not famil-
iar with English, might themselves be diagnosed as deficient in abil-
ity.
It must be noted, however, that diagnosis of a child whose native
tongue is other than English is just a more obvious and more narrow
component of a whole host of language problems arising from cul-
tural dissimilarity. Hence, translation of IQ tests into Spanish does
not significantly diminish the failure rate of Latin American children.
For instance, the test might call for the definition of a word of increas-
ing rarity, or perhaps a word whose frequency is greater in one culture
than in another. In Larry P., for example, one of the children was
unable to define "cushion," but received credit when the vocabulary
item was changed to "pillow."
1 84
182. Kagan, The Concept of Intelligence, THE HUMANIST, Jan./Feb. 1972, at 8.
183. Affidavit regarding evaluation of M.S., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306
(N.D. Cal. 1972). The child's picture arrangement showed a burglar escaping rather
than being apprehended. No credit was given for that answer on the standardized test.
184. Affidavit regarding evaluation of J.L., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306
(N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, Civil No. 72-2509 (9th Cir., filed Aug. 28, 1972).
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Still another source of error related to language occurs when a
middle-class examiner administers the test to a child of a different
linguistic background, who accordingly misunderstands the examin-
er's pronunciation. 18 5 Although this is not the only reason for varia-
tion in test results when the testor and testee are of different ethnic
background, that factor remains a well documented variable in pupil
performance.' 86
That language factors might cause failure on IQ tests was rec-
ognized by Judge Wright in Hobson v. Hansen:
Verbalization tends to occur less frequently and often less in-
tensively. Because of crowded living conditions, the noise level
in the home may be quite high with the result that the child's
auditory perception-his ability to discriminate among word
sounds can be retarded.
8 7
Group intelligence tests suffer the even greater liability of no con-
tact with the testee by a psychologist or psychometrist trained to inter-
pret individual variations in results. The grossly distorted results are
simply recorded and subsequently utilized, despite the absence of an
administrator to develop rapport, obtain cooperation, maintain the
interest of the child, or to acquire background information essential
to an accurate interpretation of the test results. In recognition of the
minimal utility and unreliability of such tests, the California State Leg-
islature passed two bills this year designed to restrict their use.188
185. Mercer, supra note 160, at 325. See also Watson, IQ-The Racial Gap,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1972, at 48.
186. Dreger v. Miller, Comparative Psychological Studies of Negroes and Whites
in the United States, 57 PSYCHOLOGIcAL BULL. 361 (1960); Thomas, Hertzig, Dry-
men & Fernandez, Examiner Effect in IQ Testing of Puerto-Rican Working-Class Chil-
dren, 45 A.. J. ORTHOPSYCmATRY, 809-21 (1971). Upon retesting with the same in-
strument, the black psychologists attempted to eliminate factors of cultural bias, and
the six children plaintiffs in Larry P. each scored 17-38 points higher than on their
previously administered test. This result, while not necessarily proving superiority
of methods on the retest, at least indicates a substantial variance in the result on the
same test, depending on the race of the examiner, i.e., the test is not "reliable" in psy-
chometric terms. Similar results of retesting occurred in Diana v. State Board of Ed-
ucation, No. C-70-37 R.FP (N.D. Cal. June 18, 1973) where Spanish-speaking children
were retested in their native language by a Chicano psychologist. See affidavit of
Steven Moreno, exhibit to plaintiffs' complaint.
187. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 481 (D.D.C. 1967), af'd sub nom.,
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
188. Assembly Bill No. 665 sponsored by Assemblyman Leroy F. Greene was re-
cently enacted into law and took effect in March 1973. It eliminates all state man-
dated group intelligence tests previously given in grades 6 and 12. A.B. 665 (1972).
Assembly Bill No. 483 introduced by Assemblyman Willie Brown would have elimi-
nated optional tests as well, but was vetoed -by the Governor in July 1972. A.B. 483
(1972). Approximately 50 percent of local school districts continue to administer
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Such remedial legislation, however, did not reach the inherent cultural
bias which remains in individual testing.
All the tests currently in use in the public schools have been
normed and standardized principally by testing members of the domi-
nant culture. Both the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children and the
Stanford Binet Test, the two most commonly used, were exclusively
standardized on Anglo-American children. The Peabody Picture
Vocabulary test was similarly standardized on a population of approx-
imately 4000 white children in the area around Nashville, Tennes-
see. No mention is made in any standardization group of minority chil-
dren. This omission is inexcusable in light of the culture-bound na-
ture of examination content. These materials are used to measure
comprehension, conceptual and perceptional skills yet they reflect pri-
marily the culture in which the test was developed. 189 In Dr. Mercer's
terms, the tests are "Anglocentric." As the Court found in Hobson:
The evidence shows that the method by which track assign-
ments are made depends essentially on standardized aptitude
tests which, although given on a system-wide basis, are completely
inappropriate for use with a large segment of the student body.
Because the tests are standardized primarily on and are relevant
to a white middle class group of students, they produce inaccu-
rate and misleading test scores when given to lower class and Ne-
gro students. As a result, rather than being classified according
to ability to learn, these students are in reality being classified ac-
cording to their socio-economic or racial status, or-more pre-
cisely-according to environmental and psychological factors
which have nothing to do with innate ability.' 90
Courts will be very reluctant to accept currently used tests as cul-
turally relevant and accurate indicators of natural ability. All the
evidence points to these devices as seriously biased instruments which
just about guarantee that white middle-class children will obtain the
highest scores.
Absent a showing that the test is relevant to a minority child's
cultural experience, reliance on the tests for significant educational de-
cisions is in effect an operational acceptance of the notion that there
are genetic differences in intelligence.191 The court in Larry P., having
shifted the burden of proof to defendants, refused to assume any rela-
group aptitude tests, but this practice is being challenged in pending litigation. Ruiz
v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 218194 (Super. Ct., Sacramento, filed Dec. 16, 1971).
189. Mercer, supra note 179, at 325-27.
190. 269 F. Supp. at 514.
191. See, e.g., Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?,
39 HA~v. EDUC. RBv. 1 (1969).
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tionship between race and ability to learn unless proof were made to
that effect.192  The school district, although not embracing any notion
of inherited differences in intelligence, did suggest a relationship be-
tween poverty, malnutrition and mental retardation. Without proof
of the alleged connection, the court properly refused to take judicial
notice of it, and instead assumed what our democratic principles man-
date-that the ability to learn is spread randomly throughout the
population.
193
Race, Learning Ability and Morality in Public Education
In the employment area, where a purportedly neutral test operates
to exclude disproportionately a racial group, use of the test is pro-
hibited unless it can be shown to relate to job performance.' 94 The
measure of competence used in hiring must be validated; that is, it must
have a known significant relationship to actual performance on the job.
This relationship may be shown by an empirical comparison indicat-
ing a high degree of correlation between test scores of individuals and
their on the job proficiency ratings. Alternatively, the device may be
validiated by the "content-construct" method whereby sufficient in-
formation from job analysis demonstrates the relevance of the content
or construct of the test.' 95
192. Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employ-
ment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 691, 695 (1968). Proof could be offered that
racial discrepancies in IQ test scores indicate inherited differences in intellectual abil-
ity. See, e.g., Hermstein, IQ, ATLANTic MONTHLY, Sept. 1971, at 43; Jensen,
How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDUC. REv. 1
(1969). But this assertion assumes the viability of the IQ tests as a measuring device,
and can be countered by numerous other explanations of the performance gap. See
Bernstein & Giacquinta, Misunderstanding Compensatory Education, 39 HARV. EDuc.
REv. 587 (1969) for reactions to Jensen's article. See also discussion of the cultural
bias of IQ tests in text accompanying notes 179-91 supra. In any case, for political
reasons it is highly unlikely that school officials will urge a justification relying on
genetic differences in intelligence, and even less likely that a court would accept such
an argument.
193. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1310-11 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also
address by Jane R. Mercer, Pluralistic Diagnosis in the Evaluation of Black and Chi-
cano Children, American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 3-7,
1971 (finding that with measurements of adaptive behavior and a cut off score of 69,
rates of mental retardation were approximately equal among the various ethnic
groups).
194. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
195, See discussion of validation in Western Addition Community Organization v.
Alioto, 330 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 340 F. Supp. 1351
(N.D. Cal. 1972). See also R. THoRND & E. HAGEN, MEAsuramMNT AN EvALuA-
NON iN PSycHOLOGY AND EuCATION 616-41 (3d ed. 1969).
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The educator's justification of scholastic aptitude or intelligence
tests in the schools is comparable to validation in the area of employ-
ment. While admitting that the tests are not entirely appropriate indi-
cators of the innate mental ability of minority children, school officials
assert their utility as predictors of subsequent school performance. 196
Thus they contend that the real issue is abuse of the tests and not the
instruments themeselves: "To abolish the tests while ignoring the fact
that different students (and different classes of students) perform
differently is about as sensible as the ancient Greek practice of slaying
the messenger who brings bad news."'
1 97
The skills required to do well on standardized tests seem to re-
semble skills required to earn high grades in school. As Anastasi
points out, slow work habits, emotional insecurity, low achievement
drive, lack of interest in abstract problems and other culturally linked
conditions which tend to lower test scores are also likely to handicap
the individual in his educational and vocational programs.'98 Al-
though the correlation between grades and test scores is far from per-
fect, and despite the myriad subjective variables which influence both
results, there does seem to be a relationship.
The defect in the argument that test results predict school per-
formance lies, however, in the cary-over effect or self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Reliance on the results of culturally biased tests may cause the
same racial and ethnic bias to manifest itself later in the classroom. It
brings us full cycle, back to Judge Wright's observation that "[t]he
real tragedy of misjudgments about the disadvantaged student's abil-
ities is . . . the likelihood that the student will act out that judgment
and confirm it by achieving only at the expected level."' 199
One significant and specific tactic of the psychologists who re-
tested "retarded" black children in Larry P. was reinforcement and
encouragement to help the children overcome their chronic lack of
196. The predictive validity of such tests is not sufficiently high to justify such
extensive reliance on test results. The correlation between test prediction and school
performance is around .60. JENCKS, supra note 9, at 144. Chaney v. State Bar, 386
F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1968). Chaney held the
California bar examination valid on its face because it tests "capacity to analyze . . .
legal situations [and therefore] has a rational connection with the capacity to practice
law . . . . "
197. David Kirp, "Schools as Sorters" unpublished paper, 1972, at 73.
198. A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 466-92 (3d ed. 1968). See also
Wesman, Intelligent Testing, 23 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 267-79 (1968); J. CONANT, SLUMS
AND SUBURBS (1961).
199. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 491 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.,
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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confidence.200 The Court's findings credit this establishment of rap-
port, overcoming defeatism and early distraction, with the substantial
improvement of these children's test performance.20'
Another reason a simple employment test "validation" is inap-
propriate in the school context is the nature of what is being measured.
The employer naturally desires the work force which will most com-
petently perform on the job regardless of its racial composition. The
definition of proficiency is relatively immutable, as are the ease of ini-
tial measurement and validation, when we want to determine whether
someone is capable of painting a house, for example. Somewhat
comparable in the school context is a test of a child's achievement or
attainment in a particular subject such as arithmetic or reading. Even
this task is beset by the infinite nuances and gradations in pinpoint-
ing the academic level. Measuring intelligence is in a completely dif-
ferent realm, both because of the immense moral and political overtones
with which the very term is laden, and because intelligence can mean so
many different things. To say that intelligence is what the tests meas-
ure, and that what the tests measure is important because intelligence
is important, is to take the road which "leads through the looking
glass." It would be equally logical to assume that intelligence is of no
more consequence in human life than are scores on intelligence tests.20 2
Obviously, there are some inherited biological differences between
races, such as eye color or hair texture. But these characteristics should
entitle no one to any special favor. We might reconsider, then, the pro-
priety of sorting children into stereotyped categories on the basis of fif-
teen point differences on tests which reflect no more than acquisi-
tion of the specialized vocabulary of the dominant culture. When
children from low socioeconomic status or minority ethnic backgrounds
consistently do more poorly on these tests, and when educators rely on
a seriously biased instrument to sort, classify and label children in the
public schools, are they not embracing a sort of genetic and cultural
fatalism by making success on the tests a rite of passage to positions
of power and wealth in the society? 2°5 Do they not make a moral
200. Affidavits of William Pierce, Harold Dent, and Gerald West, Bay Area Asso-
ciation of Black Psychologists, Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
appeal docketed, Civil No. 72-2509 (9th Cir., filed Aug. 28, 1972).
201. 343 F. Supp. at 1306-07.
202. JENcEs, supra note 9, at 56-57.
203. See, e.g., M. SCHWEBEL, WHO CAN BE EDUCATED? 75-76 (1968). Even a not-
able proponent of the concept of genetically conditioned differences in intelligence
recognizes that equality of rights is a moral axiom which does not depend upon any
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judgment to perpetuate and reinforce rather than to alleviate whatever
cultural "disadvantages," i.e. differences, the minority child brought
with him to the school.
20 4
The Educator's Responsibility for Nonschool Factors
What is the significance of academic disparities which result not
from prejudice in the schools, but instead from the individual plight
of children from ghetto families? Every student brings to the starting
line of his educational career different advantages and disadvantages
caused in part by his social, economic and cultural background, cre-
ated and continued completely apart from any contribution by the
school system. It is not doubted that children from poverty neighbor-
hoods enter school in America less prepared than their middle-class
counterparts in the essential skills of reading and arithmetic.
Perhaps we should not blithely exculpate school authorities from
any responsibility, as some courts have.20 5 Nevertheless, we must
frankly reflect on the fairness of charging our educational institutions
with the weighty burden of rectifying the results of long-standing and
pervasive racial discrimination in the society at large. To what ex-
tent, then can the public school take the children as it finds them? Does
the equal protection clause extend no further than to provide them
with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers and curriculum as is pro-
vided to others in the district? Is the equal protection clause not sat-
isfied until the outcomes of schooling (e.g. pupil achievement, job
attainment) offer no limit of the immense inequalities existing outside
the schools?
The argument that the equal protection clause requires equal at-
tainment at least for people of similar abilities20 6 finds support in other
such differences, even if they could be scientifically proved. Jensen, The Ethical Is-
sues, THE HUMANIST, Jan./Feb. 1972, at 5-6.
204. Achievement tests, at least, do not pretend to do what they cannot. They
may well be a useful indicator of the acquisition of skills most important for getting a
good job and for full participation in an increasingly technical world. See OFFICE OF
EDuc., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUc. AND WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OP-
PORTUNITY 20 (1966). But, again there is a moral concern in the use to which we put
the test results. Do we attribute responsibility to the child and brand him an "aca-
demic failure" or do we ascribe the child's failure to a defect in the system and at-
tempt to tailor the institutional program more to the child's educational and social
needs?
205. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. granted, 93 S. Ct.
2786 (1973); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 60-61 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
206. See, e.g., Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147, 1166-72
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areas of the law where courts have required state officials to remove
harmful inequalities even though state or local government was in no
way initially responsible. The rights to vote207 or to prosecute an
appea 208 are extremely tangible matters, however, which are more
measurable than the concept of equal educational attainment. En-
forcement of a judical remedy is difficult, if not impossible, when
the goal is intangible.
Where racial segregation results from neutral neighborhood school
assignments, courts have begun to pierce the transparent veil of even
handed treatment.209 In most of these cases, a theory of school re-
sponsibility was derived from acts by school officials which com-
pounded the existing inequalities. In Hobson v. Hansen the court re-
quired a plan to include compensatory education for children in the
residentially segregated inner city who had hitherto been denied the
benefits of integrated education.21 0 Similarly, in United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, the court ordered the school dis-
trict to "provide remedial education programs which permit students
. . . who have previously attended segregated schools to overcome
past inadequacies in their education." 211  This approach is merely an
extension of the finding that the school district was responsible for the
racial separation and of the assumption made in Brown21 2 that segrega-
tion caused the achievement disparities. The "affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary [to eliminate] racial segregation
. . . root and branch 213 also presumes that the school district's ac-
tions render it constitutionally liable for the existence of segregation.
(1966); Horowitz & Neistring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Edu-
cation and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 787 (1968); Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 Hv. EDuc.
REv. 635 (1968).
207. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
208. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
209. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp.
208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr.
606 (1963).
210. 269 F. Supp. at 515.
211. 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
212. "'A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segre-
gation . . . therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental develop-
ment of negro children.... ."' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
213. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). See also Swanm
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
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Furthermore, educational research uniformly concludes that school
resources and even racial composition are of almost negligible im-
portance as predictors of achievement when compared to nonschool
factors such as family background or community characteristics. As Dr.
Coleman stated:
[S]chools bring little influence to bear on a child's achievement
that is independent of his background and general social con-
text . . . . [T]his lack of an independent effect means that the
inequalities imposed on children by their home, neighborhood,
nad peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities
with which they confront adult life at the end of school. For
equality of educational opportunity through the schools must im-
ply a strong effect of schools that is independent of the child's im-
mediate social environment, and that strong independent ef-
fect is not present in American schools.
214
This lack of independent effect may partially explain the unimpressive
results of compensatory education programs designed to remedy cul-
tural and racial disparities in school accomplishments. On the other
hand, it may be premature to judge these programs, because the
resources invested thus far have been of such small magnitude that
they could not be expected to have more than an infinitesimal im-
pact on the educational experiences of recipients. 1 ,
Seemingly, the schools cannot under any theoretical obligation of
equal educational opportunity be made to remove entirely the impact
of nonschool factors upon pupil achievement.216 Nonetheless, the
mandate to make a genuine attempt to alleviate such disparities is not
diminished. A court cannot find from the comparative failure of mi-
nority children that they are somehow inferior. Rather, the persist-
ent and undiminishing gaps between racial groups in academic success
214. OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 325 (1966).
215. See Cohen, Defining Racial Equality in Education, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 255,
260-64 (1969).
216. In Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), Judge Waddy
ordered that no child be excluded from a regular public school unless the school board
provide adequate alternative educational services "suited to the child's needs" which
could include special education or tuition grants, and "a constitutionally adequate prior
hearing, and periodic review of the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of
any educational alternative." The district was required to provide "to each child of
school age a free and suitably publicly supported education regardless of the degree of
the child's mental, physical or emotional disability or impairment." (Memorandum
Opinion pp. 24-26). In Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), the court held that notice and hearing must be
afforded any allegedly mentally retarded child recommended for any fundamental
change in educational status. Must the court administer the schools to enforce and im-
plement these decisions?
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must be viewed as a failure by school authorities. The underlying pre-
mise must be one of institutional responsibility and the underlying hope
must be one for institutional reform. The very least we can demand,
from the perspective of a moral and constitutional imperative, is
that school officials not perpetuate the discriminatory effects of non-
school factors. Yet this is precisely what they do when under the guise
of homogeneous ability grouping, scientific testing instruments and
special education classes, minority students are rank ordered and dis-
proportionately relegated to the lowest strata of the school curriculum
and hence to the bottom ranks of society.
2 17
Remedial Measures Toward Racial Equality
The Methods of School Classification
Educators have begun to recognize that they can no longer con-
tinue to hide behind the indefensible and inexcusable use of culture-
bound tests of intelligence for the classification of children in public
schools. Hence, a number of efforts have been made to modify the
instruments and the manner in which they are used.
In response to Diana and to the urging of psychologists, the Cali-
fornia procedure was amended so as to require translation of tests
into the native language of the testing subjects.218 Such efforts have
not met with success, 219 however, because of gaps in experience among
different cultures. Even where alternate wording was utilized to ad-
just for culturally different meanings, additional problems arose in the
clinical interpretation and use of the test results.220 Similarly, because
of the cultural bias in content, experiments in relying more heavily on
performance portions rather than verbal parts of tests produced no sig-
nificant change for black children.22' Such modifications either fail
217. Walter Lippmann warned long ago about the genetic fatalism inherent in
the use of these tests to create "an intellectual caste system." Lippmann, The Abuse
of the Tests, 32 NEw REPuBLIc 297 (1922). See also M. SCRWEBEL, WHO CAN BE
EDUCATED? 75 (1968).
218. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 5, § 3401. See stipulated agreement in Diana v.
Board of Educ. (settled June 18, 1973). See also Darcy, Bilingualism and the Measure-
ment of Intelligence: Review of a Decade of Research, 103 J. GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY
259 (1963); Torrance, Testing the Educational and Psychological Development of
Students from Other Cultures and Subcultures, 38 REV. OF EDuc. RESEARCH 71 (1968).
219. Moran, Observations and Recommendations on the Puerto Rican Version
of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 10 PED)AGoGIA 89 (1962). See also
Mercer, supra note 179, at 324-38.
220. Coyle, Another Alternate Wording on the WISC, 16 PSYCHOLOGICA, REP.
1276 (1965).
221. Mercer, supra note 179, at 326-27.
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to erase cultural variations or leave the evaluator without a normative
framework from which he can interpret results.
Efforts might also be made to recruit and employ minority psy-
chologists and psychometrists to conduct and interpret tests of mi-
nority children, but such efforts will prove fruitless in many areas be-
cause of the paucity of such people. Requirements of in-service train-
ing of personnel who administer tests, or who evaluate and place chil-
dren in special classes, is also inadequate by itself to correct the problem,
because the cultural background and experience of personnel is only
one of many variables affecting test performance. Attempts to sub-
stantiate test results with adaptive behavior measures of a child's func-
tional performance or with investigation of the child's home environ-
ment are not objective because conclusions might be affected by the
school authorities' primary reliance on standardized tests.222
A better solution might be to use differential norms for differ-
ent ethnic groups. This solution has been both attacked as reverse
discrimination and advocated as necessary to compensate for past in-
equities. The nature of psychological testing makes it logically neces-
sary, however to use different norms for different ethnic groups,
since identical cut-off points are inherently discriminatory. The prin-
ciple has long been established by the use of different norms on intel-
ligence tests for boys and girls, by different height and weight limits
for men and women, and by different actuarial mortality tables for life
insurance on males and females, not to mention differential rates ac-
cording to occupation and area of residence. Utilizing this kind of
pluralistic evaluation, a child's intelligence would be evaluated only in
relation to others who come from similar backgrounds and who have
had approximately the same opportunity to acquire the skills necessary
for success on the "Anglocentric" tests.223
Since the legal and moral justification for use of psychological
tests is their presumed ability to predict performance, it would only
be fair to predict as accurately as possible, that is, to use norms ap-
propriate to each ethnic group. For the more widely used tests,
222. See Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1311-12 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
223. Hence a Mexican-American child from an overcrowded Spanish speaking
home in a rural area who scores only 75 on an IQ test would not be "intellectually
subnormal" unless he scores in the lowest three percent of his own sociocultural group.
Instead, he may be considered a person with normal learning ability who needs help in
English as a second language. Such an educational diagnosis is manifestly different
than one which labels him as retarded in intellectual development and incapable of ac-
quiring any facility in intellectual matters. Mercer, supra note 179, at 334-36.
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the development of separate norms for ethnic groups would be just as
feasible as are the gender specific, residence specific and occupa-
tion specific norms for insurance purposes, assuming, of course, our
willingness to accept highly imprecise delineation of cultural bound-
aries for particular groups.
A better solution, in light of the dubious validity of many intel-
ligence or aptitude tests, is simply to return them to the womb of the
laboratory for more adequate scientific gestation. An increasing number
of psychological organizations, although defending the instruments them-
selves, have recognized the pervasive and abusive practices based on
test results and have called for a moratorium on the use of such tests
in identifying and classifying school children, at least until a more ap-
propriate instrument might be developed.
22 4
School officials might contend that the abolition of intelligence
tests in the absence of any more suitable, currently available alterna-
tive is to burn down the barn to be rid of the mice. The argument that
the tests pose an objective safeguard against overtly discriminatory
school classification based on other factors must be evaluated in light of
the distortive effects which the tests may have on the rest of the evalua-
tory process.
Although the use of intelligence and ability testing began as an
effort to insure objectivity and to reduce the effects of individual prej-
udice and discrimination, the results are often just the opposite. As
a recent review observes:
Advocates of testing point to the objectivity of tests as a check
against the personal prejudices of interviewers and hiring per-
sonnel. Tests, however, introduce their own 'element of racial bias,
and their results can provide a smoke screen for those who wish
to discriminate. An employer of seven hundred who selects ap-
plicants by interview and recommendations alone will find the
absence of Negro workers harder to explain than one who can point
to a record of poor test scores to explain Negro rejections.22 5
In a sense, IQ tests distort the process of referral screening and
evaluation of children by removing the responsibility for racially un-
balanced classes for the educable retarded from the consciences of
224. The President's Committee on Mental Retardation, The California Associa-
tion of School Psychologists, and the Bay Area Association of Black Psychologists
have all suggested such a moratorium. See discussion of A.B. 483 (1972), A.B. 665
(1972), in note 188 supra. A more appropriate measure might be one which takes
sociocultural variables into account and considers how well a person functions in school
or job, home, and community rules. See, e.g., Mercer, supra note 179.
225. Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Em-
ployment and Education, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 691, 744 (1968).
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teachers and administrators. If teachers and administrators had to
assign children to these classes on the basis of their personal, subjec-
tive experience with the children, they would have to bear the moral re-
sponsibility for finding a high proportion of black children unfit for
normal classes, if they did so find. The IQ testing gives the teachers
and administrators a chance to achieve the same result without ac-
knowledging to themselves or to others that they are responsible for
the outcome. 22 6 If the IQ tests were eliminated, and the assignment
made a matter of teachers' recommendations plus parents' consent, the
proportion of black EMR children probably would fall. Indeed, the
teacher's decision to make the initial referral of a child as potentially re-
tarded may be largely influenced by his low score on a group intelli-
gence test, the teacher's consequent low expectation and the child's
inevitable poor school performance.
227
Furthermore, the IQ tests can be used to convince reluctant par-
ents that their children are mentally retarded. Waiver of the child's
interest cannot be competent if "scientific" test scores are overly im-
pressive to unsophisticated parents.
The tests' distortive effects on pupil screening and evaluation are
equally severe in the placement of children in classes for the gifted. The
initial screening and referral of potentially gifted pupils relies heavily
on group tests or in some cases on teacher recommendation. Teach-
ers might be hesitatnt to recommend a student who has scored in the
median range on the standardized group tests, and students might have
a difficult time overcoming the test-created presumption that they
are not so bright after all. Even those minority children eventually
referred for psychological assessment are then administered the cul-
turally biased individualized test which makes it highly unlikely that
they will eventually be placed in the special class. Current Califor-
nia regulations permit some students to be enrolled in classes for the
gifted even when they fail to score in the ninety-eighth percentile on in-
dividual tests, but the number is limited to a paltry 5 percent of the
overall enrollment in such classes.
228
Thus, the task of identifying academically talented or creative
226. Not only is the teacher relieved of responsibility by having "scientific"
justification for differentiated educational programs, but the tests are perfectly con-
sistent with the educators' demands for efficiency and smoothness in the operation of
the public schools.
227. See notes 21-24 and 176, supra regarding the "self fulfilling prophecy"
problem in public school.
228. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 5, §§ 3821-22.
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children, like that of selecting children with low learning potential,
might be approached more objectively by school personnel whose
views are not unduly influenced by results on tests which inaccurately
purport to measure innate ability or aptitude. The distortive and prej-
udicial effects which such instruments have on the evaluative process
generally dictates an immediate moratorium on their use as a device
for tracking of any kind.
Achievement tests may contain the seeds of similar bias and dis-
tortion as much as the intelligence tests. They at least purport to
measure only what has already been learned, and therefore do not be-
guile educators into placing the responsibility for "learning difficulties"
squarely and solely on the child. The difference is between a find-
ing that a child is inherently difficult to educate and a conclusion that
he has not adequately mastered mathematics and needs help in that
area. To the extent that standardized tests may legitimately be used,
they must be diagnostic tools for ascertaining a child's educational need,
and they must lead to prescriptive education with the school as an in-
stitution making strides to meet those specific urgent needs. If fur-
ther information is needed regarding the psychological, physiological
or neurological causes for a child's academic difficulties, assessment can
be done without reliance on impersonal and culturally distorted
standardized tests. 2 9
Alternative means of screening and evaluating children for educa-
tional placements are possible. Certainly it would be of little use to be
rid of the discriminatory tests, only to find school authorities perpetra-
ting the same injury by utilizing more subjective factors. The screen-
ing process could be commenced with an evaluation by the classroom
teacher utilizing a special checklist or even the more traditional
tool of school evaluation-grades-and psychological interviews could
be conducted without reliance on standardized intelligence or ability
tests. The question is whether the use of such procedures would
diminish the disproportionate impact of school classification?
A number of school districts have attempted to develop a check-
list to help teachers, psychologists and counsellers identify pupils
with creative potential for placement in the gifted classes. Such indi-
cators are based largely on the research of Dr. E. Paul Torrance on char-
229. Some alternate possibilities of screening and evaluation of children for
placement in retarded classes are suggested in Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306,
1313-14 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Findley, How Ability Grouping Fails, INEQuALrIy
iN EDucAliON, No. 14, 38.40 (1973).
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acteristics of talented black children in Georgia and in Minneapolis.
2 30
One reason this method has not been entirely successful in reducing the
disparity in representation in gifted classes is their use in conjunction
with intelligence tests. In Oakland, for example, the checklist is uti-
lized only for students who score well on group tests."' In San Fran-
cisco, where the standardized group measurements are no longer in use,
the last step in the placement process is still administration of an indi-
vidual test.
23 2
These more traditional and accepted tools of school evaluation
are subject to many of the defects inherent in standardized tests. Unless
classroom teachers are provided a manual with specific standards for
use of a checklist or for according grades, there will be little interjudge
reliability. Checklist items as disparate as "has a tendency to lose
awareness of time", "is an avid reader", "tends to dominate peers or
situation" and "frequently interrupts others when they are talking"
have highly uncertain relationship to learning potential. The identical
personality function can indicate a bright student who is bored in the
classroom or a rambunctious student who misbehaves in class in or-
der to compensate for intellectual insecurity. The validity of such a
measurement would be almost impossible to demonstrate. The defects
in the use of such a checklist are equally apparent whether the check-
list is used for identifying creative and talented youngsters or for iden-
tifying retarded children with learning difficulties.
Grades suffer from many of the same defects. They are influ-
enced by a wide variety of factors other than performance. What-
ever cultural objectivity may be asserted, the total subjectivity of grad-
ing standards would seem to negate the legitimacy and fairness of this
criterion for estimating a child's potential. A certification system based
on grades without reliance on standardized tests might disadvantage
minority and lower class children even more.2 33 Even a system based en-
tirely on aspiration and free choice would still probably produce raci-
ally disparate educational and occupational attainment, if aspirations re-
mained unchanged.
2 34
230. Torrance, Identifying the Creatively Gifted Among Economically and Cul-
turally Disadvantaged Children, 8 GIFTED CHILD Q. 171, 175 (1964).
231. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DIsT., APPLICATION FOR PRIOR APPROVAL OF PRO-
GRAM FOR MENTALLY GIFTED MINORS, Appendix A (1972).
232. Affidavit of William B. Cummings, Director of Gifted Program, Johnson v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., Civil No. 70-1331 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 3, 1972).
233. Findley, How Ability Grouping Fails, INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION, No. 14,
38-41 (1973).
234. JENCKS, supra note 9, at 155-60.
1182 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
This is not to say that all educational assessment of school chil-
dren must be discarded as too subjective or insufficiently relevant. Aca-
demic assessment of pupils is central to any educational system, and the
highly subjective element in that process is inevitable. On the other
hand, we should not conclude that tracking practices as currently imple-
mented in our public schools must remain because there is no way to
eliminate educational disparities. What is needed is a system which
guides and supports rather than strangles and distorts the academic
development of individual school children.
The search for the most appropriate, screening and measuring
devices for all cultural groups is largely illusory, and so may be the ul-
timate goal of eliminating educational inequality. Nonetheless, our ob-
jective to desegregate classrooms should not be abandoned. The un-
derlying premise of school desegregation transcends the intangible de-
sire for equal educational opportunity. The real issue is whether ra-
cial groups will emerge from the schools, not only with differing
credentials and attainments, but with an abiding sense of alienation
and hostility toward each other. Whatever the means of screening
and classification for academic purposes, it is the discriminatory im-
pact which must be rectified. The primary task is to build a founda-
tion which can withstand the tensions of racial diversity. The build-
er's tools may not lie in the educator's office but in the moral coffers
of our Constitution.
The Lawyer As Handyman-Tools for Legal Solution
One approach focuses on the procedural rights of pupils assigned
to less favored classifications. Procedural due process would require
some form of hearing and impartial determination of fact whenever the
school proposes to make a basic change in the child's educational sta-
tus. Fairness would surely dictate prior notice and hearing when the
child is removed from the mainstream of academic pursuits and
placed in a program to which any stigmatizing label might attach.235
235. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), requiring hear-
ing before names of alleged problem drinkers would be posted in taverns and package
stores; Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., filed Feb. 8, 1971). Many
lawyers concerned with classification practices seek greater procedural safeguards as a
way to focus attention and criticism on such practices, and because due process "is the
likely winner in court." See, e.g., McClung, School Classification, INEQUALrIY IN EDU-
CATiON No. 14, 17-37 (1973); D. Kirp, Schools as Sorters, paper to be published later
this year in U. PA. L. REv. See also Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972), for an extensive and well-considered judicial mandate for appropriate
procedures.
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The requirement of even an informal hearing obviously would be
too cumbersome for school adminstration if applied to the vast quan-
tity of minute and quotidian classification or evaluation decisions.
School officials will feel somewhat threatened when pupils and parents
insist on access to school records or seek the benefit of advice and as-
sistance from disinterested members of the community, not affiliated
with the school district.
Moreover, when the school official's judgment is couched not in
disciplinary terms but as a scholastic evaluation, and when there is no
acknowledgement of potential inconsistency between the child's inter-
est and that of the school, parents are likely ill-equipped to challenge
the proposed assignment or even to recognize a possible misdiagnosis
or stigma. Procedural requirements thus would mean not only the
time-consuming task of rendering the academic decision comprehen-
sible to the layman, but the possibility of challenge over a matter
jealously guarded as the schoolman's special domain.
The appearance of due process may not only be a cruel hoax but
also may make the classification itself more difficult to overturn. The
ostensible process of careful administrative review of a decision to clas-
sify an individual child would appear to legitimize the substantive de-
cision. Courts will be more likely to defer to the experts' determination
when that decision was submitted to serious scrutiny at the school.
Moreover, children will be substituting the inadequate ad hoc review
of the accuracy of an individual assignment for the more sweeping and
fundamental challenge to the propriety of the classificatory scheme.
Nonetheless, for school assignments of special or enduring signifi-
cance to the child involved, whatever their supposed benefits, the very
least that is warranted is a full discussion of its ramifications be-
tween family and school authorities. Given the impracticality of ad-
versary procedures, a good substitute might be for an informal meeting
where the school's analysis is explained and the parent must consent to
the initial placement. Especially in cases where the child is placed in
a class at the lower echelons of the school curriculum, there should be
a carefully informed consent, guided by the normal legal principle of
a "knowing intelligent and voluntary" waiver.236 The parent also
should retain the right to withdraw consent and revoke the placement
at any time and for any reason.
236. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399, 439 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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One obvious problem with this solution is the unlikelihood of
meaningful consent. When a child is to be placed in a class for the re-
tarded, for example, the parent ideally should be told the exact nature
of the suggested assignment (no euphemisms), that the manner of se-
lection may not be appropriate and may result in mislabeling the child,
and that the classification will be noted in a permanent school rec-
ord. It should also be explained that the choice is entirely up to the
family, that no action will be taken against them if they refuse place-
ment, and that they should consult with independent groups if they
have any doubts.
Another consideration in making parental consent a prerequisite
to placement is the independent interest of the child in his own edu-
cation, which may conflict with his parents view.237 A student dissatis-
fied with a determination by school officials further may be coerced
by a consenting parent who tends to accept the "expert" advice of school
authorities regarding what is best for the child's further academic prog-
ress.
Moreover, there must be substantial doubt that a requirement
of consent can be a sufficient safeguard. Experience shows that ghetto
parents rarely if ever contest a school placement decision. "They
would feel incapable of arguing the point even if they were aware of
it."'23s  In Larry P., despite the overwhelming imbalance in EMR
classes and the resulting presumption of culturally erroneous classifi-
cation, fewer than 2 percent of parents in the past two years have re-
fused consent to the placement.239 The mere requirement of consent
cannot be viewed as an adequate remedy unless it in fact achieves
classroom racial parity.
A much more controversial proposal is for the use of mathematical
ratios to rectify past discrimination in the classification and assign-
ment of school children to special programs or ability groups. Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education240 places this kind of
237. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting in part) (recognizing child's independent interest); Chandler v. South Bend
School Dist., Civil No. 71-5-51 (N.D. Ind. 1971); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 165 (1944); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938).
See discussion of the special status of children in J. CooNs, PRIVATE WEALTH ANT) PUB-
LiC EDUCATION 419-26 (1970).
238. THE PRESDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CUME 241 (1967).
239. Answers to Interrogatories propounded by Plaintiffs, Feb. 6, 1973, at 3, no.
4, Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, Civil No.
72-2509 (9th Cir., filed Aug. 20, 1972).
240. 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
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remedy squarely within the discretion of the district court in disman-
tling segregated school systems. Although race is a forbidden criterion
for assignment when used to promote segregation, it now appears per-
fectly acceptable when the goal is integration. A similar remedy was
employed in United States v. Montgomery County Board of Educa-
tion2 ' to insure that the proportion of black and white teachers in the
school district would be mirrored in each school. The doctrine finds
further support in the area of employment where, for example, in
United States v. Iron Workers Local 86242 the Court of Appeals ap-
proved a district court decree ordering building construction unions to
offer immediate job referrals until blacks comprised about 30 percent
of union membership.2'8
Imposition of racial quotas in the area of employment or jury dis-
crimination seems easy enough. We can assume that the job will be
done with about the same efficiency no matter what the racial proportion
among the employees. Just verdicts will presumably be rendered with
regard to any criminal defendant, so long as members of his particular
ethnic or racial group are not systematically excluded from repre-
sentation on jury roles. But the ramifications of racial parity in the
classrooms as well as in the public schools seem much more complex
and unforeseeable.
The use of mathematical formulas would introduce the most ar-
bitrary criterion of all into the school's selection and sorting process.
How can we speak of diagnosing the special needs of individual
school children and prescribing innovative programs to fulfill those
needs, yet at the same time propose an unyielding numerical re-
quirement? Ratios or quotas are surely less relevant than grades or
even ability tests for scholastic purposes. Like the abolition of track-
ing itself, the imposition of statistical demands is heavy-handed and is
a further restriction on an already overrestrictive system.
It would seem undesirable to convert the courts into glorified
school boards, supervising the day-to-day administration of public ed-
241. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
242. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). See also United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
243. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Contractors
Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d
1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971); United States v. Central Mo-
tor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970). In these cases similar ratio goals
were utilized to remedy effects of past discrimination in employment.
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ucation.24" Whatever the fallibility of educators and their programs
for disadvantaged children, we should not saddle the courts with school
problems which they have even less competence to solve. Courts
also have much less public accountability than do the educators for
mistaken decisions.245
But judges are not obliged to provide a complete remedy; they
need only to precipitate more appropriate action by school authorities
in light of long standing constitutional principles.24 6 Without undue
interference in the educative process, they can simply tell school offi-
cials to stop violating constitutional rights, to desist from using irra-
tional and culturally biased means of classifying children and to elimi-
nate debilitating racial isolation in the classrooms. Given the vast array
of less discriminatory alternatives, judges should not be reluctant to re-
quire school authorities to try them.
In light of the inevitably disproportionate affect of any classifica-
tion system in the schools and the overriding imperative of achieving
maximum social and racial integration, courts must be educated in the
use of ratios which do not strangle the educational potential of the
pupils. The Court in Larry P. was "particularly wary" of plaintiffs'
proposal for racial quotas because of the possibility that white par-
ents would refuse consent and thereby would reduce the number of
placements available to black children who really are retarded. 247  The
244. Judicial conservatives have often expressed great reluctance to intrude in the
daily operation of schools. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 598-99 (1940). As the Chief Justice observed in Yoder v. Wisconsin: the
judiciary is "ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete aspects of a State's
program of compulsory education." 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972). This concern with the
unenviable judicial task of "managing" the schools might seem especially warranted
here given the minuteness and frequency of school evaluation and classifica-
tion decisions as to each child, were it not for the overriding concern with the dispro-
portionate racial impact of such decisions for school children generally. Given the
existence of classroom segregation gross enough to be proved by statistics, the issues
can be framed by attorneys in an intelligible manner and addressed by courts in man-
ageable fashion. Classifications like ability grouping or placement in special classes
are more highly visible, and are of longer duration and of greater significance than
the grading of examinations or similar pupil evaluation. Obviously, the more impor-
tant the consequences of the classification decision, the more appropriate it is for ju-
dicial review.
245. Bickel, Shelly Wright's Sweeping Decision, 157 NEW REPuBLIc, July 8, 1967,
at 11-12.
246. Tigar, In Defense of Shelly Wright, 157 NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 15, 1967, at
41-43.
247. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The court did
not deny such requested relief but merely asserted that this and other remedies were
inappropriate at this preliminary stage of the proceeding.
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Court's concern should be mitigated by a showing of the rarity with
which any parents deny consent to such a placement. A simple solu-
tion would be the computation of a more flexible ratio, allowing the
district to adjust its requirements by the number of families who de-
cline consent to the placement or who utilize private facilities instead.
The Court's reservations would not be applicable to special educa-
tion programs for especially bright, creative or highly motivated stu-
dents where the objective of minority groups is to attain adequate pro-
portionate representation.
The use of racial ratios, albeit somewhat arbitrary, offers the
speediest solution to a fundamental institutional problem-the discrimin-
atory segregation of minority children. The ratio can be justified as an
essentially interim measure whose further utility will be obviated when
more appropriate screening and selection criteria, which do not cause
racial imbalance, are in use in the public schools. As such, it can be
viewed as affirmative action to correct past discrimination, not an
operating plan for perpetuity. As with any equitable remedy, school
districts should not be required to take precipitous action, but
should have a reasonable amount of time to achieve the constitutionally
required racial balance. And perhaps most significantly, the end
result should not be a rigid quota which might harm individual children
or require complicated computations every time a new child was added
or removed from a special class. Flexibility must be built into a
judicial decree so as to best account for the divergent educational needs
and aspirations of children regardless of their racial or ethnic back-
ground.
2 47 A
The educators themselves have begun to recognize that imposi-
tion of percentage goals may be the only effective means to diminish
classroom segregation and to approach the objective of racial equal-
ity in education. The California Education Code now requires for
special programs such as mentally gifted and educable mentally retarded
a written explanation from school districts "if the percentage of chil-
dren from any minority ethnic group in such classes varies by 15 percent
or more from the percentage of such children in the district as a
247a. Strict quotas are unwise, since even random chance will inevitably result in
some disproportion in all school classification. The prayer in Larry P. and the Court's
order in Diana incorporate the desired flexibility by permitting any variance which is
not "statistically significant," thus allowing for differing amounts of racial imbalance,
depending on the size of a school district and the size of its minority population. The
point at which variance in the representation of any group becomes "significant" under
this formula is the point at which it can no longer be explained as merely the product
of chance.
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whole." 248  Lowell High School recently abandoned a geographic quota
system designed to provide more representation from all portions of
San Francisco.249  Similarly abandoned was a flexible admissions pol-
icy for students designated as having ability and past achievement
indicating a high degree of academic promise, but failing to meet the
rigid admissions requirements.2 50 Both geographic quota systems and
flexible admissions policies to encourage cultural and racial distribu-
tion among student bodies are in frequent use by many colleges and
universities.25' Although unwilling to achieve racial parity in this
manner, Lowell High School ironically continues to use a differential
standard for evaluating male and female applicants for admission so
as to avoid a disproportionate representation of women in the student
body. 52 The use of a similar technique to achieve racial balance in the
classroom certainly would be no less laudable.
Judicial reform of school classification practices may well evoke a
re-examination of basic premises by school officials. Imposition of a
constitutional mandate may impel schools to address more intelli-
gently the subtle nuances of student ability and cultural diversity, and
to treat them as a blessing rather than a burden. On the other hand,
the dissolution of racial and socioeconomic concentrations of similar
students in the same classrooms may augment the flight to the suburbs
and to private schools. The unwillingness of school authorities to bear
the mantle of educational equality may have a disastrous effect on
the quality, even the very existence, of public education. Judicial en-
248. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.095 (West Supp. 1973). Although exact statistical
parity cannot be legally required, this particular "safeguard" seems highly inadequate.
The suggested quota would, for example, permit a district where 10 percent of the ele-
mentary children are black to have up to 25 percent black children in classes for the
retarded and none in the gifted program. Moreover, the smaller the ethnic group's
representation in the district, the greater the allowable disparity. Finally, it should be
noted that the "remedy" when such a continuing racial imbalance is reported is merely
that further investigation may follow.
249. Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, Record on Appeal at 180-224, Ex-
hibit B, Berkelmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., Memorandum Opinion and
Order of Summary Judgment, Dec. 19, 1972, appeal docketed, Civil No. 73-1686 (9th
Cir., filed April 11, 1973).
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minor-
ity Groups to Higher Education, 80 YAL LJ. 699 (1971); Reynoso, La Raza, The
Law and the Schools, 1970 U. TOL. L. Rnv. 809, 827-31.
252. Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, Record on Appeal at 180-224, Exhibits
L and N, Berkelmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., Memorandum and Or-
der of Summary Judgment, Dec. 19, 1972. But see Bray v. Lee, 337 F. Supp. 934 (D.
Mass. 1972) (ruling differential norms by sex for admission to Boston Latin School a
denial of equal protection).
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forcement of equal educational opportunity must reach toward desir-
able social ramifications.
Judicial reform of school classification practices fulfills the same
objectives as it does in decisions striking down school segregation.
It may lead to a simmering truce or even engender widespread oppo-
sition. Nevertheless, in light of the tremendous strides in desegre-
gating the public schools since Brown, we must conclude that judicial
intervention against racial discrimination in the schools is appropriate.
It crystallizes the issues and legitimizes the struggles in the legislature,
in the community and in other political arenas. It fosters assent and
compliance with constitutional requirements by creating a climate for




Judge Wright addressed some of these important issues in his
"parting word" to Hobson v. Hansen:
It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case the court
must act in an area so alien to its expertise. It would be far bet-
ter for these great social and political problems to be resolved in
the political arena by other branches of government. But these
are social and political problems which seem at times to defy such
resolution. In such situations, under our system, the judiciary must
bear a hand and accept a responsibility to assist in the solution
where constitutional rights hang in the balance. So it was in
Brown v. Board of Education . . . So it is in the South, where fed-
eral courts are making brave attempts to implement the mandate
of Brown. So it is here.
254
In delineating the parameters of permissible school action, courts
are ill equipped to administer the educational system. They cannot
carry the candle, but they can kindle the flame of equality in educa-
tional opportunity. As law is normative of men's conduct, so social
justice is normative of law.
253. See Kirp, The Role of Law in Educational Policy, 2 SOCIAL POLICY, Sept./Oct.
1971, at 42; Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV.
193, 208 (1952).
254. 269 F. Supp. 401, 481 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nona., Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). When the case was affirmed on appeal, three dissenting
judges felt that the concerns expressed in the "parting word" should have controlled,
and that these issues were not suitable for judicial resolution. Id. at 192-94.
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